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The Indian subcontinent provided the British 
their most important colonial enterprise. Management 
and preservation of the Indian Empire demanded the ener­
gies, in one way or another, of every branch of the 
British political system. In consequence, the relation­
ship between British India and its neighbors acquired 
enormous significance. British involvement in Afghan­
istan, India’s neighbor to the west, offers a unique 
opportunity to explore why, after one-half century of 
non-intervention there, the Government adopted policies 
which led to a war in 1878- and nearly forced the British 
to assume control of the country.
Classic studies of imperialism, such as the works 
of John Hobson, V. I. Lenin, Joseph Schumpeter, Ronald 
Robinson and John Gallagher, have tended to focus on 
one specific motive for expansion; for example, economic 
or strategic interests. The British, however, did not 
approach Afghanistan with direct expansion in mind. More 
complex forces drove them there. In recent years scholars 
from several disciplines within the social sciences 
devised a technique of analysis of decision-making
specifically designed to make the elements of very complex 
issues more manageable. Psychologists and political 
scientists initially found this method effective for 
its predictive potential. Members of related fields 
such as history, have adapted the theory of decision­
making analysis to meet their particular needs.
An ideal decision-making situation requires that
there occur recognition of the need for a decision, selec-
X
tion of an alternative and an expected result. A dis­
tinctive imperial decision-making model relates these 
three elements to the frame of reference in which imperial 
decision-makers operated. On investigation seven general 
features of the imperial decision-making process emerge. 
They are: 1) strategic considerations, 2) economic 
maneuvers, 3) restraints produced by the organizational 
structure of government, 4) effects of individual person­
alities within the government, 5) private pressure groups 
such as the press and missionary societies, 6) the ele­
ment of chance and, 7) the response of the "victim." The 
last two of the characteristics of the process are the 
most difficult to assess. Chance generally created situa­
tions in which those responsible made defensive decisions 
in response to unanticipated contingencies. Evaluation 
of the "victim's" response depends upon availability
X
Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck and Burtin Sapin 
Foreign Policy Decision-Making: An Approach to the Study 
of International Poll tic's (New York! The Free- Pres s of 
GTencoe, A Division of tfhe Macmillan Company, 1962) 90.
of accurate sources not commonly produced in either the 
"victim" country or that of the aggressor.
The decision-making approach to the study of 
imperialism stresses the entire process of policy-build­
ing which often resulted in colonial expansion. No single 
decision generated the division of the colonial world by 
western nations. These policy-making processes embraced 
a chain of decisions made by many people for varied rea­
sons. John Cohen, in Behavior in Uncertainty and its 
Social Implications, aptly described the decision-making 
process as a "bridge between thinking and doing." The 
act of making a decision involves three separate groups
of activities: predecisional information gathering,
3
choice-making and execution. Each of these activities
involves specific questions. For example, what factors 
did the decision-makers consider relevant during the data 
collecting period; what parameters did they use to deter­
mine the pertinence of those factors; what goals did they 
choose, why did they choose these objectives and what 
source did they utilize?^ The final choice indicates that 
the decision-makers have settled their differences and
2John Cohen, Behavior In Uncertainty and Its 
Social Implications (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd.,
T m r  13TT
3
Snyder, Foreign Pol icy Decision-Making, 9
^Ibid., 66.
accept accountability. How and why they selected a par­
ticular alternative assumes particular significance by 
uniting all three elements of the process. That those 
involved regarded their choice as successful or not 
becomes less important than why they considered it such. 
Their personal evaluation permits invaluable insight into 
the character of their goals.
David Miller and Martin Starr, in The Structure 
of Human Decisions, have argued that human beings rarely 
choose- the optimum alternative when making a decision.
They tend rather to favor a solution adequate to solve 
the immediate problem but one without any potential to 
preclude future similar difficulties. Indecision neces­
sitates decision. Doubt about an existing situation pre­
cipitates a new decision in order to eliminate uncer­
tainty. The fact that new decisions result from prior 
ones further limits the number of alternatives avail­
able.^ In turn, choices with only short-range problem 
solving potential provoke future decision-necessity situa­
tions. The effectiveness of a decision, however, need 
not be judged in terms of its "goodness." A decision may 
be rational in a policy-making sense while not "good" by
5 Ibid■, 91.
David W. Miller and Martin K. Starr, The Struc-
ture of Human Decisions (Englewood Cliffs, New J e r s e y : 
Prentlce-Hall, Inc., 1967 ) 50.
^Snyder, Foreign Policy Deci sion-Making, 90
humanistic criteria. The decision-maker evaluates a deci-
8sion’s rationality by its usefulness. For example, a 
government may decide to withdraw its program of aid from 
a less-developed nation because the recipient government 
has adopted a political ideal antagonistic to the donor. 
The decision, while perhaps not a ’’good” one for the 
people of the poorer country, is rational in the sense 
that it provides a tool for bargaining to the developed 
nation. There are no ’’good” decisions; only effective 
and ineffective ones. This concept permits easier compre­
hension of seemingly unfeeling decisions.
Political decision-making analysis endeavors to 
observe the activities and methods of those governed and
thereby to draw some categorical conclusions about these
9
functions and the people who performed them. This infor­
mation permits the construction of typologies, grouping
10of functions similar under certain circumstances, or 
11’’dimensions” of the potential political behavior of both
12organizations and the individuals within. These
g
Wayne Lee, Decision Theory and Human Behavior 
(New York: John Wiley and Sons-^ Inc 1971) 7-9T
9
Glenda Goldstone Rosenthal, The Men Behind the 
Decisions: Cases in European Pol icy Making [Lexington,
Mass . : Lexington Looks, 1975 ) T~.
^  Snyder, Foreign Pol icy Dec i s ion-Making, 27.
11 Russell N. Cassel, The Psychology of Decision- 
Making (North Quincy, Mass.: The Christopher~Tublishing 
Housed .197 3 ) 37.
12 Snyder, Foreign Policy Decision-Making, 44, 55.
typologies furnish the basis for a model of the political 
decision-making process. This abstraction allows implicit 
assumptions to be drawn from the general information col­
lected about the organizational structure and its members
and then applied to specific decision-making circum- 
13stances. Typologies consist of variables which make 
synthesis less complicated and accordingly decrease anti­
t h e s i s . ^  These groupings reveal deviations in the behav­
ior of decision-makers which call attention to unusual 
conditions necessitating special investigation.^"*
Two categories of variables comprise the imperial 
decision-making model: psychological and sociological.
The psychological variables involve the behavior of the
decision-makers under particular political circum- 
16stances and their behavior as it related to the system 
to which they belonged -■ the sociological variables or 
machinery of g o v e r n m e n t . ^  Therefore, analysis of behav­
ior focuses on the conduct of government organizations 
themselves and on some relevant aspects of the personal 
and professional training of its officials.
13 Colin Edin and John Harris, Management Decis ion 
and Decision Analysis (London: The MacMillan Pre s s , 197 5) 
7 L 7 --------------- -----
14Ibid., 102.
^S n y d e r ,  Foreign Policy Decision-Making, 3 
16Ibid., 27.
 ^Ibid . , 41 .
The rules of the organization in many ways govern
/
the decision-maker's choice. Each individual, however,
defines those rules in accordance with his own experience
because this procedure constitutes learned behavior like
18any other such process. Several factors influence the 
learning process. First, the decision-maker's education 
and professional training inculcate in him the ethics of 
culture. Extended association with peers intensifies com­
mon attitudes until the group position becomes the indivi-
19 20dual's. In Africa and The Victorians Robinson and
Gallagher pointed out that with the "collective mind,"
the integrity of the group takes precedence over that of
the individual. Information external to career life, such
as that from childhood experiences, also influences the
21making of decisions. In many cases, however, and parti­
cularly in nineteenth century Britain, government organi­
zations attracted such similar types of people that those 
events often correlated with the professional ethic.
18 Ibid., 161; Cassel, Psychology of Decision- 
Making , 7 9.
19Muzafer Sherif, In Common Predicament: Social 
Psychology of Group Intergroup ConilTct and Ccldperation 
(Boston: Houghton Miff1 in Company, 1966) ix; Herbert AT 
Simon, Admini s tra t ive Behavior : A Study of Dec i. s ion-Making 
Processes in Administrative Organization fNew York: The 
MacMillan Lompany^ TW5TVTE. -----------
20Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher with Alice 
Denny, Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of 
Imperial ism ("London: Macmillan and Company Limited, TU61 )
t t - 2 1 . -----
21 Rosenthal, The M e n , 136-37; Simon, Administra- 
tive Behavior, 16.
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The sociological variables strongly affect the 
psychological by providing the framework in which the 
latter operate. The following definition illustrates the 
extent to which the organization controls its asso­
ciates. "An organization is a social system explicitly
set up to influence its members towards the achievement 
22of some goal." The nature of the institution and its 
purpose, as well as its associations with other organiza­
tions, control the decision-making behavior of its members 
by supporting certain attitudes towards success and its
criteria and by determining the amount of authority given
23to each member. Although it is true that "the whole 
is different from the sum of its parts," these "parts"
derive their relevance from their relationship to the
i f . 2 4machinery or government.
The explicit influence of the organization on the
goal-seeking competence of its associates, in fact,
increases their effectiveness. Consideration of the
entire spectrum of standards when choosing an alternative
poses an unmanageable problem. The decision-maker
22 Peter B. Smith, Groups Within Organization: 
Applications of Socia1 Psychology to Organizational Behav­
ior (London: Harper and Row, T973)~T.
23Sir Geoffrey Vickers, The Art of Judgement: A 
Study of Policy Making (New York: Basic Books, Inc . , 1^65)
itfr---------- --------
24John D. Aram, Dilemmas of Administrative Behav- 
ior (Englewood Hills, New Jersey:~Prentice-Hal1, I n c ., 
T976) 3-4.
facilitates his task, therefore, by selecting from within
25the goals of his organization. He appears to do this
even when strong incompatibility arises between the aims
2 6of his organization and those of society at large. The 
impact of party politics on imperial decisions illustrates 
this point quite well. The decision-maker ultimately 
assumes the organizational objective as his own because
2 7his future success depends on that of the organization.
Decisions, like those who make them, become a part 
of a larger process. Thus they cannot be examined in iso­
lation. In fact, decisions necessitated under spectacular
conditions well may be the least indicative of the dis-
2 8positions which directed policy-making. Policies emerge 
in continued reaction to events and the people who produce 
those events. Routine decisions exerted more influence 
and therefore provide a better expression of general 
trends in policy-making.
In retrospect, one fact often appears to have 
prompted a decision and to have had a greater impact on 
the choice made than any others. Numerous scholars have 
discussed the effect of economic necessities on imperial
2 5Sherif, In Common Predicament, 16; Simon, Admin- 
is tra tive Behavior  ^ 12-13 .
2 6 Simon, Administrative Behavior, 13-14
27Ibid., 17.
2 8John Cell, British Colonial Administration in 
the Mid-Nineteenth Century: The Policymaking Process TNew 
Haven: Yale University Press’^ T9 7 0 ) xi .
idecision-making but have ignored the influence of govern­




An understanding of the structure of the British 
Colonial government is essential to establish the hier­
archy of authority, the interrelationships between its 
branches and also to provide an idea of the kinds of 
personalities who made and executed decisions. John Cell, 
in his study of British Colonia1 Administration, contended 
that the ’’collective mind” exerted influence both in 
London, the center of imperial policy-making, and 'in the
I
field' itself. This composite perception evolved from 
the general ambiance of the nationalistic imperialism 
often associated with nineteenth century Britian. The 
British Civil Services during the nineteenth century 
developed into a highly organized governing facility which 
presumed its fellows would serve their country guided by 
ideals which transcended class favoritism or shifts in 
governmental leadership. This concept of British 
officials as servants of the nation rather than the 
government well may have been a chimera. If so, some 
specific investigation into the organization of the
1
Cell, British Colonial Administration, 215.
British government in the late nineteenth century and its 
members becomes imperative. As Sir Geoffrey Vickers 
emphasized in his study of the role of personal judgement 
in policy creation, "the individual decider can no more 
be studied in isolation than the individual decision. The 
mental activity and the social process are indissolu- 
a b 1 e . " ^
Numerous offices of the British government shared
responsibility for colonial administration. The Colonial
Office supervised the affairs of actual colonies while
the Foreign Office directed the Protectorate regions. The
secretary of state for India and his council managed the
3
most important of Britian's colonial undertakings. Many 
other divisions of government, beginning with the Crown, 
influenced the making of imperial policy.
The Crown
The Crown possessed no officially specific author­
ity over the formulation of colonial policy. Nonetheless, 
Queen Victoria demonstrated a profound interest in the 
control of her colonial empire, unlike many of her prede­
cessors.^ Her satisfaction with the Disraeli Ministry
2
Vickers, The Art of Judgement , li>.
3
Paul S. Reinsch, Colonial Government: An Intro- 
duction to the Study of CoIonia1 Institutions (New York: 
The MacmTTlan Company" 1926) 288.
4
Henry L. Hall, The Colonial Office, A History 
(London: Longmans, Green and Company, 193 7) 6H.
1 J
versus her displeasure with that of Gladstone illustrates
the direction she preferred vis-a-vis imperial policy.
The charm and peculiar glamour of parts of the Empire,
especially India and the Orient, aroused the "Victorian"
5
romanticism of both the Queen and Disraeli. The Queen's 
ready acceptance of Disraeli’s proposal that she assume 
the title of Empress of India in the face of staunch 
resistance from his opponents exemplifies her fondness 
for the exotic.^
Queen Victoria endorsed a forceful foreign pol­
icy. Although not actively a warmonger, she accepted the 
contemporary belief that armed opposition offered the only 
creditable solution when another Power threatened the 
frontiers of Britain's Empire.^ This philosophy explains 
her increasing hostility toward Russia as that nation 
manuevered closer and closer to British India and menaced 
Britain's footing in the East. Consequently, Victoria's 
support of the Turks in 1878 ensued from her antagonism 
towards Russia rather than from affection for the dying
5
Frank Hardie, The Political Influence of Queen 
Victoria 1861- 1901 (London: Thomas Nelson Ltd.,-T935; 
reprint e d ., London: Frank Cass and Company Ltd., 1963)
42.
6Carl A. Bodelsen, Studies in Mid-Victorian Imper- 
ialism (Printed by arrangement with Glydendalske Boghan- 
d e l , Copenhagen; New York: Howard Fertig, 1968) 124.
^Hardie, Queen Victoria, 169, 174.
^Ibid., 161.
g
Ottoman Empire. Victoria wrote to Disraeli in the same
year that if she were a man Mshe would like to go and give
those Russians, whose word I cannot believe, such a
beating! We shall never be friends again til we have
9
out. This the Queen feels sure of." Disraeli took
advantage of her mood to encourage the appointment of
Salisbury as Secretary of State by assuring her of his
10anti-Russian stance.
The Queen primarily disliked Gladstone for his
cautious approach to foreign policy and his consequent
opposition to Disraeli.. She held Gladstone personally
responsible for the potential of war with Russia in 1878
and therefore strongly resisted his appointment as Prime
11Minister in 1880. In the general election of 1880, how­
ever, the public gave him an' overwhelming vote of confi-
12dence which increased the Q u e e n ’s hostility.
Near the end of the war with Afghanistan (1881) 
Victoria opposed Gladstone's desire to end British occupa­
tion of the city of Kandahar. He wished to free England 
from any further involvement in Afghanistan while she
8 Ibid., 161.
9
George Earle Buckle, The Life of Benjamin Pis- 




11 Hardie, Queen Victoria, 68.
12Ibid., 71.
strove to retain a link she felt would protect India’s 
western frontier. Her objection to Kandahar's abandonment 
deadlocked the January 5th Council meeting at which the 
Prime Minister planned to announce the release. When he 
finally made the statement an observer reported he had 
never seen the Queen so enraged. "She would not," she
complained, "be an Emperor William to Gladstone’s Bis-
i ,,13 m a r c k .
The relationship of the Queen with Disraeli and 
Gladstone reveals both her influence and her impotence.
On the one hand, she could insure the appointment of a 
sympathetic cabinet official. On the Other, she stood 
powerless before a Prime Minister with a satisfied popu­
lace behind him. The vicissitudes of government, however, 
caused the people's contentment with their officials to 
vary widely while the Crown perservered. A dramatic 
occurrence easily upset a prime minister and his party 
especially when he often had opposed the Crown. The 
aftermath of General G ordon’s defeat at Khartoum (1885) 
demonstrated the Monarch's still active political influ­
ence. Victoria blamed Gladstone for the fiasco for 
sending Gordon back to Africa in the first place. The 
Gladstone Government did not fall immediately but it lost
a great deal of the public's confidence and collapsed
1shortly thereafter on a budget bill.
13Ibld., 75-76.
14
Hardie, Queen Victoria, 84-85.
Prime Ministers
The prime minister enjoyed no more legal author­
ity than the other members of the cabinet. The position 
had evolved through time as the business of government 
became more complicated. As chief executive and leader 
of the cabinet the prime minster gui'ded the formation of 
policy. As the leader of his party, however, he exerted 
the most influence. Party policies often became British 
policy. Therefore, the efficacy with which the prime min­
ister presented and supported those ideas determined the
15fortune of his party.
Two very individualistic men led the British gov­
ernment during the period of involvement in Afghanistan
in the late 1870s and early 1880s: Disraeli (Lord Beacons-
16field) and William Ewert Gladstone. Disraeli served 
as Prime Minister in 1868 and again from 1874 to 1880. 
Gladstone held the office four times - 1868 to 1874, 1880
to 1885, 1886 and 1892 to 1894.^^ Both Disraeli, a Con­
servative, and Gladstone, a Liberal, fostered the goals 
of their respective Parties and brought the force of these 
opinions to policy creation. As a result, the two
15 Walter Bagehot, The Engli sh Cons t i tut ion (Wash­
ington: M. Walter Dunne, 1901) 79-80.
16 For purposes of clarity Lord Beaconsfield will 
be referred to as Disraeli.
17 F. Maurice Powicke and E. B. Fryde, e d s . Hand­
book of British Chronology (London: Offices of the Royal 
HistoFTci! Society, 1961) 109.
different Governments differed widely in foreign policy,
especially on colonial matters.
Essentially Disraeli aspired to make England
impressive to the world through her Empire. At his death
his Secretary of State, Salisbury (1874-1880), observed
that his chief's "zeal for the greatness of England was
18the passion of his life." Adherence to Conservative
Party principles ranked just after his sense of duty to
country. Personal ambition, of which he possessed a great
19deal, stood third.
Carl A. Bodelson, in Studies- in Mid-Victorian
Imperia1 ism, argued that the acceptance of the Disraeli
Government by the British public in 1874 indicated their
20growing attraction to "national self-assertiveness."
Disraeli saw an opportunity in the British reaction
against the former Government's separatist policies to
weaken Liberal opposition. He created a cause cele-
21bre -- the enhancement of Britain's world position. This 
issue would forward both the goals of his country and his 
party. Disraeli appreciated better than Gladstone the 
subtleties of party politics. He realized the heightened
■^Buckle, Disraeli , ^




appeal of empire at a time when much of the grandeur of
England had gone. Disraeli's own interests focused his
22attention on the Indian Empire.
Disraeli's outspoken attraction to Indian matters
23added greatly to his reputation as a "jingo." Histor­
ians also associate him with the "bombastic" school of 
British politicians; i.e., those who viewed expansion as 
an end in itself; as a means to celebrate the glory of 
the mother country. His relish for the trappings of
Empire,, such as his determination to make Victoria Empress
2 Aof India, demonstrates his enthusiasm.
The prime minister, with no specific constitu­
tional privilege, functioned rather as a guide than as 
a commander. Disraeli, however, assumed extensive control 
over government during his tenure as prime minister.
George Buckle, one of his biographers, stated that Dis­
raeli directly supervised the policies of the Foreign
Office. Consequently, adversaries censured Disraeli
23rather than Foreign Office officials. On the eve of 
the second Afghan War in 1878 Disraeli exhibited his
^ T .  H. S. Escott, The Story of British Diplomacy: 
Its Makers and Movements (London: T. FTsher Unwin, 1908j 
T9T.------------------------
23 A "jingo" is one who vehemently supports his 
country and advocates an aggressive foreign policy.
L\
*" Bodelsen, Studies in Mid-Victorian Imperialism,
124.
^ B u c k l e ,  Disraeli, 241.
tendency to interfere. He warned Lord Cranbrook, Secre­
tary of State for India, ” there can be no cabinets
now and matters must be settled by myself and the Secre­
tary of State for Foreign Affairs We must control
2 6and even create events.”
Gladstone, in contrast to Disraeli, concerned him­
self primarily in domestic affairs. "Economy at home and
27non-intervention abroad” characterized his administra­
tion. These interests and his hope for European har- 
2 8mony made him a separatist. Most British, however, had
abandoned the doctrine of separation by 1875. In later
years Gladstone defended his position saying that he had
not been ” insensible to the glory and responsibility
of the colonial empire.” He had, in fact,
. . . considered important the business of
founding and cherishing these colonies in which 
one had so distinctly been entrusted by Providence 
to the care of the people of this Country that 
we should almost as soon think of renouncing the 
very name of Englishman as of rg^ouncing the very 
great duties [of the colonies].
Economy became the byword of the Gladstone 
regime. Secretary of State Granville, a follower of
26Ibid., 381-82.
27 John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, Africa and 
the Vic torians, 92-93.
2 8Agatha Ramm, e d ., The Politica1 Correspondence 
of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville 1876-1886, I (Oxford: 
THe~~Clarendon Press, 1962) xviii.
zu
30British economist Richard Cobden, strenuously championed
Gladstone's program to disengage Britain from foreign
31entanglements. Consequently, the principal of non-
32intervention guided Gladstonian foreign policy.
Disraeli and his Secretary of State held quite 
a different viewpoint from that of Gladstone and Gran­
ville. Salisbury described the former great Imperial
Powers -- the Chinese, Spanish and Ottoman Empires, as the
3 3"dying nations." He believed that new Imperial 
giants - Great Britain, the United States and Russia
3 4-soon would divide the colonial world. Social Darwinism
supplied for him and his many supporters the rationalism
that well-developed societies had an obligation to share
the benefits of their progress with less-developed peo- 
35pies. Salisbury's desire for a dynamic foreign policy 
added to Disraeli's reputation as an aggressive 
imperia1i s t .
30 Cobden is known best for his support of free 
trade and a minimum of government involvement abroad.
^ J o h n  Morley, The Life of W i 11iam Ewert Glad- 
stone, (New York: The MacMillan Uompany, 1932) 595.
^ E s c o t t ,  The Story of British Pi plomacy, 333.
3 3William L. Langer, "A Critique of Imperialism," 
Foreign Affairs, October, 1935.
3 A Social Darwinism is the application of Charles 
Darwin's 1859 theory of natural selection to evolution 
within human societies. Apologists for colonialism often 
used this sociological adaptation to defend their activi­
ties.
35 Langer, British Diplomacy, 7
Salisbury’s methods also provoked criticism, 
fundamental lack of trust in the judgement of others 
obliged him to work in complicated and often secret
o c
ways. He rarely requested advice from the Foreign
Office staff and frequently even neglected to inform them 
3 7of events.. Even though he designed his policy to pre­
serve Britain's rank in world affairs, he inhibited his 
effort by seeing things only from the perspective of 
Whitehall. Consequently, his methods resembled "an elabo­
rate game of bids and counter bids [begun] and ended
38on the maps of Foreign Office."
The Colonial Office
The Colonial office supervised the formal posses­
sion of the Crown. It exercised no control over Protec- 
39torates, which fell under the jurisdiction of the For­
eign Office, or over the Indian Empire, the domain of the 
India Office. Many other areas of government did influ­
ence the administration of the colonies, however. Thus
3 6Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victori-
a n s , 256 .
^ H a l l , The Colonial Office, 269; Ray Jones, The 
Nineteenth Century Foreign Office: An Administrative His­
tory (London! Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971) TTW.
3 8
Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victor-
ians, 25 7.
39 A situation in which protection by one nation 
is offered to a less powerful one in return for certain 
considerations such as control over foreign policy.
divisions of authority frequently provoked heated debate
.1 rc- 40 among the offices.
The position of parliamentary undersecretary 
topped the hierarchy of the Colonial Office. The parlia­
mentary undersecretary advised and assisted the foreign 
secretary on colonial matters. His jurisdiction ranged 
from immigration and military business to the personal 
reception of all important dispatches. The permanent 
undersecretaries, second in line of precedence, headed 
the actual office staff. The parliamentary undersecre­
tary conveyed to the Colonial Office the opinions of the
Government, while permanent undersecretaries handled all
A  i
the routine business. The importance of the permanent
undersecretaries hinged on their knowledge of the mundane
aspects of colonial administration. They exerted very
little influence on policy-making directly but their
advice often provided the basis on which their superiors
A 2made decisions. Consequently, their skill and experi­
ence, or lack thereof, had a substantial impact on policy 
format i o n .
First assistant secretaries, principal clerks and 
first class clerks made up the balance of the Colonial 
Office staff. The clerks physically administered the
^ C e l l ,  British Colonia 1 Admin i s t ra t ion , 38-39.
4 1 Ibid., 7.
/ 0
Ibid., 20; Reinsch, Colonial Government, 289.
routine business of the Office. Therefore the people in 
the Colonies felt that "the 'Mother Country' is generally 
synonymous with the chief clerk in the Colonial 
Office .
The effectiveness of the Colonial Office depended
on the competence of its staff. Studies of nineteenth
century Colonial Office personnel show that the majority
had very little knowledge of Colonial affairs. Only two
members in 1870 had had any previous experience with the
44colonies, at all. Political patronage rather than cap­
ability determined appointments prior to 1872 when the 
Government established the practice of open competition 
and examin a t i o n . ^  This new selection procedure, however,
did not alter the appearance of the Colonial Office roster
46in any appreciable way. As a result, most of the Colo­
nial Office staff throughout the nineteenth century came
from similar backgrounds. They absorbed the standards
47and objectives of the group. Not surprisingly new mem­
bers soon adopted the office's opinion on colonial manage­
ment .^8
^ R e i n s c h ,  Coloni a 1 Government:, 289.
^ H a l l  , The Colonial Office, 27.
45
Brian Blakely, The Colonia1 Office (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1972) 152, 159-60.
4 6 Ibid., 152.
47 Cell, Brilish Colonial Administration,
4 8 Ibid., 39.
Other factors also frustrated the efficiency of 
the Colonial Office. Supervisors did not apportion the 
work load equitably. In addition they inhibited moti­
vation by rarely permitting subordinates to make deci­
sions. So little cooperation existed between departments 
within the Colonial Office that communication became
nearly as difficult as that with other sections of the 
49Government. Telegraph communications with the colonies 
presented still another problem. Information by telegraph 
usually arrived in fragments which imparted a sense of 
urgency to all messages -■ crucial and commonplace 
alike. Unprepared staff members felt required to respond 
immediately and thus, at times, impulsively. As a result 
they often created, rather than controlled, confu­
s i o n . ^  In truth, the Colonial Office did not "run" the
colonies. It simply reacted to events as best it
-ia 51 could.
The Foreign Office
The Foreign Office directed Britain's relation­
ships with foreign nations as well as its dealings with
52Crown Protectorates. A parliamentary and a permanent
49 T, . ,Ibid., 24-25.
50T K . ,I b i d ., 43.
51Tk. , Ibid. , 24.
52 ,Jones, Foreign Office, 84
undersecretary directed its staff. The parliamentary 
undersecretary conducted the Consular and German Divisions 
and sat in the House of Commons. The permanent undersec­
retary supervised all of the general political busi­
ness. In 1858 the Foreign Office added an assistant
undersecretary to serve as an aid to the parliamentary
^ t- 53undersecretary.
The Foreign Office, like most of its peers, intro­
duced appointment by open competition examination during 
the 1860's. Nonetheless, it remained known as the "aris­
tocratic" office long after it accepted open competi­
tion.^^ The Foreign office gave examinations only to 
individuals nominated by an office member until well into 
the 1 8 7 0 s . A r i s t o c r a t s  directed its affairs. The for­
eign secretary and parliamentary undersecretary nearly 
always came from one of Britain's foremost families. Off­
spring of noble families comprised the greater part of 
5 6its staff. The aristocratic bias of the Foreign Office 
made it always the last branch of the British Civil Ser­
vice to accept modernization plans.
53 Ibid., 71.
~^Ibid . , 41 .
55Ibid., 61.
"^D. C. M. Platt, Finance, Trade and Politics Tn 
British Foreign Policy, 1815- 1914 (Oxfordl Clarendon 
Press, 1968) xxvTT
"^Escott, The Story of British Diplomacy, 367-368.
The examination required by the Foreign Office
in the 1870's appeared on the surface more rigorous than
58those given by the other offices. The difficulty of
the entrance examination, however, did not produce a
leveling effect on the ranks because there was no open
competition. The results of a study published by Ray
Jones in The Ninteenth Century Foreign Office - An Adrnin-
istrative History showed that only seven (7) out of sixty
three (63) appointees had earned first class university
59honors .degrees. A second survey revealed that seventy 
seven (77) out of one hundred and sixty one (161) members 
of the Foreign Office staff either were directly or 
closely related to Peers. Jones' investigation also indi­
cated homogenous educational experiences among personnel 
in the nineteenth century. Forty eight (48) had completed 
their prep school work at Eton. Sixty four (64) attended 
either Oxford or Cambridge University.*^ The similarity 
of social and educational exposure of Foreign Office 
employees molded a group with common principles and goals 
like its Colonial Office counterpart. No doubt these col­
lective biases affected Foreign Office policy-making.
The Foreign Office also suffered from poor distri- 
bution of responsibility. The foreign secretary
58Jones, Foreign Office, 5”
 ^I bi'd . , 64 .
60Ibid., 165, 188.
frequently gave the most sensitive assignments to his
61favorite undersecretary. Salisbury, when Foreign Secre­
tary, consulted none of the Foreign Office staff on 
important matters. According to one of the copyclerks, 
Salisbury created a "Secret Department" made up of his 
private associates, such as his personal secretary. Clerk 
Martin complained that Salisbury's failure to trust his
staff caused "very serious mischief and great incon-
6 2venience" in the Foreign Office.
The Consular Service
The Consular Service, although technically a divi­
sion of the Foreign Office, differed from it in several 
ways. The title of D. C. M. Platt's study of the Consular 
section, The Cinderella Service, implys one of its funda­
mental shortcomings. If the persona of Cinderella denoted 
the Service, the Foreign Office played well the role of 
the intolerant stepmother. Platt contended that the Con­
sular Service did not perceive this subservience to its
parent department "where social distinctions and snob-
6 3beries were really important."
This patronizing conduct of their superiors inten­
sified the Consular section's other problems. For
61 Jones., Foreign Off i c e , 1
^  I b i d . , 104.
C. M. Platt, The Cinderella Service: British 
Consuls Since 1823 (Hamden*! Connecticut: Archon Books, 
TT7T) 1 .*-----------
Z G
example, appointment by patronage endured there long after
6 Aother departments accepted open recruitment. Few offi­
cials expected a consul to have any specific skills or 
educational prerequisites. Lord Palmerston once remarked 
that any man could perform a consul’s function as long 
as he had that nebulous quality called "good sense." 
Unavoidably, maxims like that of Palmerston brought many 
undistinguished but socially acceptable young men to the
c c
Service. For example, only thirty-four (34) of the 
eighty-two (82) consuls in 1900 successfully completed 
the qualifying examination. More significantly, the exam­
ination was simple, uncompetitive and irrelevant because,
for the most part, the Foreign Secretary chose the
-  . 66 appointee.
Poor staff selection accounted for only one of
the Consular Corps' inadequacies. The Service rarely pro-
6 7vided its new staff with satisfactory training. Once 
a consul went to his post, the Foreign Office had no means 
to evaluate his performance. The consul's despatches and 
memoranda provided the Office with its only source of 
information. These obviously subjective reports made
^ Ibid. , 21.
6 5 I b i d . , 23.
^Ibid., 25; Escott, The Story of British Diplo­
macy, 377.
£ n
Platt, The Cinderella Service, 26
6 8appraisal difficult at best. The absence of salary and
promotion schedules for the Consular Services created
another barriar to incentive. Consul's salaries, forty
or fifty years out of date, were so inadequate by the late
nineteenth century that a private income had become manda- 
69tory. This requirement for supplementary funds severely 
limited the field of potential candidates. No explicit 
promotion policy existed nor did the Service offer any 
bonuses or h o nours.^ A consul in Puerto Rico once pro­
tested, r no system could be more depressing
to the hopes and spirit of the corps, or more detrimental
71to its zeal for the public service "
The India Office
The British government shifted control of the
Indian Empire from the East India Company to the India
Office following the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857. The Company
had dealt principally with the mercantile aspects of the
Empire. The new administration presided over both the
72economic and political spheres. Its complex
duties required a staff larger than the other divisions
68Ibi.d., 63. 
69
Ibid., 38-39; Escott, The Story of British 
Diplomacy, 377 .
^Platt, The Cinderella Service, 48.
71
Reinsch, Colonial Government, 291.
72tk.,Ibid.
of Colonial government. The government of India consisted 
of two separate divisions the secretary of state for 
India and his council in London and the viceroy (gover­
nor-general ) and his council in India. The secretary's
council numbered between ten and fifteen men, most of whom
73had served at least ten years in India, either in the
Civil Service or as soldiers, engineers or merchants.
They provided advice to the secretary of state who rarely
possessed extensive familiarity with the Indian Empire.
The Council had no power to initiate business. Power to
do so belonged only to the secretary of state for India.
Constitutional tradition however required the secretary
74to inform his council of all business. Only matters
of expenditure and nomination to office demanded majority
sanction.^ The secretary, however, could authorize very
7 6large expenditures without the council's approval and 
could overrule a vote of dissent as long as he recorded 
his r e a s o n s . ^  The secretary also personally oversaw all 
issues relating to foreign nations, war, British practices
73 Sir John Strachey, India : Its Admini. s t rat ion 
and Progress (London: Macmillan and Company, L t d ., 1903) 
F77
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with regard to Indian native States and any other matters
r 78or secrecy.
The secretary of state for India frequently 
carried on secret correspondence with the viceroy. Des­
patches on such topics as the three-way relationship 
between British India, Russia and Afghanistan rarely went 
before the Council. In truth, council members received
little more information on sensitive issues than did the 
79public. The council's utility lay in its member's
experience which generally far outweighed that of the sec-
80retary, the viceroy or the council in India.
The Crown appointed the viceroy and the members
of his council. The prime minister and secretary of state
81usually selected the candidate for viceroy. By the 
1870s the office of viceroy had developed into an impor­
tant but ambiguous position. As one observer wrote in 
1880,
I never tire of looking at a Viceroy. He is being 
so heterogenous from us! He is the centre of a 
world with which he has no affinity. He, who is 
the axis of India . . .  is necessarily screened 
from all knowledge of India. He lists no syllable 
of any Indian tongues; no race gg caste or mode 







Philip Woodruff, The Men Who Ruled India, vol.
•' The Guardians (London: Jonathan Cape^ T95?Tj 7T.
The case of Lord Robert Lytton, Viceroy from 12 
April, 1876 to 8 June, 1880, elucidates some of the char­
acteristic weaknesses of Indian viceroys. Lytton intially 
refused the viceroyalty on the grounds of ill-health and 
his "absolute ignorance of every fact and question con­
cerning India and total want of experience in every kind
8 3of administrative business." The nature of Ly t t o n 's
health problems to which he referred as his "complaint"
remains somewhat mysterious. He apparently suffered from
84nueralgi.a, respiratory and back ailments. In any case, 
his condition induced difficult periods of severe depres­
sion exaggerated by bad climate, tense situations and pro­
longed mental activity. He had declined the governorship
of Madras in 1873 for these same reasons. One year later,
8 3however, he finally accepted the viceroyalty with its 
attendant exhausting weather, complicated internal prob­
lems and increasingly fragile relationships with Russia 
and Afghanistan. On the occasion of Lytton's nomination 
Lord Derby, Secretary from 1874 to 1878, prophesized, "He
8 3Aurelia Brooks Harlan, Owen Meredith: A Criti­
cal Biography of Robert, First Earl of Lytton (New York: 
Columbia University Press! 19461 ZT41
84 Lady Betty Balfour, Personal and Literary Let­
ters of Robert First Earl of Lytton. I, ("London: Longmans ,
Green! and Company, 1906) ET3, 27 3.
o c:
Harlan, Owen Meredith, 214.
will die there; but die Governor-General. Perhaps it is 
worthwhile .
The viceroy's council, like that of the secretary
8 7for India, served him mainly in an advisory capacity.
He divided responsibility among council members according
to experience but normally handled all matters of foreign
8 8relations himself. The Royal Instructions for the India 
Government obliged the viceroy to confer with his council 
on all important business. ’ They gave him, however, dis­
cretionary powers as wide as those held by the secretary 
of state for India. The viceroy could disregard or even
overrule his council on critical or secret matters as long
89as he recorded his defense. On occasion a viceroy coun­
termanded his council as a matter of judgement, as when
Lytton abrogated a part of the India import duty on Eng-
90lish cotton over the heated protests of his council.
The amount of "extra" authority given to colonial 
"men-on-the-spot" raises important questions about imper­
ial administration. In the case of the Indian Empire the
8 6Marquis of Zetland, e d ., The Letters of Disraeli 
to Lady Chesterfield and Lady Bradford ,~~T (New Yorkl D7 
Appleton and Company, 19291 509-410.
8 7Cell, British Colonial Administration, 5C
^Strac h e y ,  India, 61.
89 Sir Anton Bertram, The Colonial Service (Cam­
bridge at the University Press, 1930) 23; Ce l l , British 
CoIonia 1 Admini s tra t i o n , 59.
90
Strachey, India, 62.
secretary of state had supremacy over the viceroy but he
resided thousands of miles away in London. Communications
remained largely inaffective even with the advent of the
telegraph. The viceroy often reacted to events in India
aware that urgency excused quick decisions; that, if
necessary, he could use the pretense of delayed instruc-
91tions to protect his actions. Sometimes a viceroy
intentionally made decisions contrary to Home government
policies. At other times he did so out of ignorance.
These decisions, regardless of motive, forced the Home
government either to accept, and thus approve, a situation
of which it disapproved or to recall the refractory offi- 
92cial. Spontaneous decisions of these "men-on-the-spot"
93often eclipsed the wishes of their superiors at home.
The India Office did attempt to restrain the 
independent conduct of its servants abroad. Lytton once 
complained to Indian Secretary Cranbrook about the posi­
tion of the council. "The disposition of that Council," 
Lytton claimed, "is to reject summarily every proposal, 
however important, or however trivial, which emanates from
91 Cell, British Colonial Administration, 4"
97
Buckle, Disraeli, 371.
93 Cell, British Colonial Administration, 4
94
the Government of India . ” Never, Lytton assured
Cranbrook, would he interfere with his privincial gover-
95nors in this manner. The tendency to ignore the
instructions of superiors clearly applied also to Indian
officials below the viceroy, once described as ’’choleric,
eccentric, warm-hearted men, who did not always pay atten-
96tion to Government orders.” Appropriation of authority 
by colonial officials occurred in all parts of the British 
Empire. In India, however, .it was most conspicuous. The 
importance of India and its great distance from the Home 
government contributed to an atmosphere of greater free­
dom. Secondly, the Charter Act of 1853, which prohibited 
appointment to the Indian Civil Service by patronage, kept 
it from becoming as aristocratic as the Foreign or Colo­
nial Offices. Consequently, it preserved a more diverse
and individualistic character than the rest of the Civil
c . 97Service.
The Treasury
The Office of the Treasury influenced imperial
.94
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Philips, W. H. L. Singh and B.N. Pandeys, eds7”7 Select 
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Oxlord Universi ty Press'^ 1962) 16.
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Emmeline W. Cohen, The Growth of the British 
Civil Service 1780-1939 (London: George ATlen and Unwin 
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policy-making in a subtle way. The rapid escalation of
expenditure in the years following the Crimean War (1854)
provoked resolute movement toward fiscal retrenchment.
The expense of the British government by 1874 reached
98twice that of twenty years earlier. The Treasury 
acquired the potential to modify policies which required 
heavy expenditure. Evidence indicates, however, that the 
Treasury customarily capitulated to the prime minister's 
wishes. No specific guidelines regulated the Treasury's 
behavior in such matters thus, when under pressure, it
found acquiescence more expeditious than strict princi-
i 99 pies .
Under a compatible prime minister such as Glad­
stone, who typified Victorian frugality, the Treasury 
could influence p o l i c y . I n  other circumstances, the 
Treasury waited until the Government adopted a policy 
before interposing its veto. In this way it reduced the 
likelihood of the policy's proponents to win support.
This practice "caused departments to try to outwit them
101instead of cooperating."
Each of the branches of the British Colonial 
government had a reasonably well-defined area of jurisdic-
98 Maurice W r i g h t , Treasury Control of the Civil 
Service 1854- 1874 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969) 329.
" i b i d . ,  335, 338-339.
100T K .iIbid., 329 .
1 01
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tion. In practice, however, one department often found 
it necessary to interfere in the bailiwick^ of another.
The Government had no consistent parameters to regulate 
conflicts of interest. So many contingencies existed 
which disturbed the administration of a policy that, at 
times, there seemed to be no policy at all. The inexperi­
ence of a clerk who neglected to send a dispatch promptly, 
the rashness of a colonial governor, the exigencies of 
party politics or an insurrection somewhere in the 
Empire any one of these conditions and many others could 
neutralize the best laid plan. Moreover, the structure 
and procedures of the British Colonial government often 
prevented the construction of sound programs. Hence, many 
uncertainties modified the creation, the application and 
the results of a policy.
AFGHANISTAN ~ A CASE STUDY
CHAPTER III 
Unmasterly Activity
The British experience in Afghanistan affords a
unique setting in which to examine the intricacies of
British policy-making. Economic and strategic interests
played a fundamental role in attracting the British. The
promise of economic rewards initially propelled the
British into the Indian subcontinent. Under East India
Company direction India became the most significant trade
center of the empire. It served as a link between other
colonial possessions, serving as a place to garrison and
reprovision troops for expeditions to other parts of the
British Empire. Consequently, the preservation of the
"noblest trophy of British genius, and the most splendid
2
appanage of the Imperial Crown" generated an intense con 
cern for the security of India's western neighbor Afghan­
istan. Imperial tacticians regarded Afghanistan, and
1
James Gervais Lyons, Afghanistan The Buffer 
State: Great Britain and Russia in Central Asia (London: 
Luzac and Company, 1910) 7~i
2
George Nathaniel Curzon, Russia in Centra1 Asia 
in 1899, and the Anglo-Russian Question- (London: Congmahs 
Green and"Company- 18891 Reprint e d ., New York: Barnes 
and Noble, Inc., 1967) 14.
particularly the city of Herat, as the major deterrent 
to a Russian invasion of the Indian Empire. Herat crowned 
the traditional avenue of assault. The road from Herat 
led to India by way of the city of Kabul, the Khyber pass 
and on through the Northwest Frontier Provinces.^ The 
tribal regions of these latter presented British strate­
gists with their gravest cause of apprehension.^
Unlike many areas of the colonial world, Afghan 
history revealed a rich and highly developed culture. The 
principles of nineteenth century Social Darwinism seem 
antithetical to a people whose tenth century ruler Sultan 
Mahmud was " the greatest military captain of the time, 
and his capital *at Ghazni was resplendent with marble 
palaces while the London of England and Harold was no more 
than a muddy village."^ The Afghans shared belief in 
Islam, one of the world's major religions, and paid at 
least nominal allegiance to a central authority. The 
British then could not justify their interference in 
Afghanistan solely in the name of civilization. Afghan­
istan, however, did share a characteristic geopolitical 
importance with other areas attractive to the British ir
3
Pio-Carlo Terenzio, La Riva1i te Anglo-Rus se en 
Perse et en Afghanistan JusquT aux Accords de 19ITT CParTs: 
Rousseau and Company, T947) 39.
Ll
A. W. Ward and G. P. Gooch, eds., The Cambridge 
History of British Foreign Policy 1783-1919, voTT Til , 
c h . 21 "Forward Pol icy and Reac t ioh^ T874-188 5" by A. W. 
Ward (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1923) 72.
^Arnold Fletcher, Afghanistan, Highway of Conquest 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, H?651 35.
40
the latter nineteenth century. Afghanistan's geopolitical 
position between the Russian and Indian empires required 
a policy designed to maintain it as a buffer.
While few mid-nineteenth century British policy­
makers encouraged colonial expansion, they had a great
6concern for existing possessions, especially the Indian 
Empire. The annexations by 1843 of the Sind and Punjab 
regions brought British India into virtual contact with 
Afghanistan.^7 The India government treated its western 
neighbor like a sphere of influence without benefit of
g
a formal agreement. Activities to produce such an agree­
ment between the British government and the rulers of 
Afghanistan in the fall of 1837 had not only failed but 
had caused a disastrous war in 1839-41. Britain's concern 
about Afghanistan as a potential vulnerable area between 
India and Russia provides an important and understandable 
explanation for their intervention in the 1870s and 
1880s. However it is an insufficient explanation for the 
construction of policies which led to a second war with 
Afghani s t a n .
Dost Mohammed, who took the title "amir" rather
Platt, Finance, Trade and Politics, 354-55.
^Sir John Miller A d y e , Indian Frontier Policy:
An Historical Sketch (London: Smith, Edler and Company, 
T B 9 7 T “2iT--------------
g
Bishewar Prasad, The Foundations of India's For­
eign Policy, 1860-1882 (Bombay": Orient Longmans Ltd., 
-----------
than "shah" to give himself religious superiority,
traveled to Peshawar in January 1857 to discuss with East
India Company officials an agreement to reinforce the
modest but friendly bond between Afghanistan and Brit- 
9
ain. The British had pledged not to interfere in the
internal affairs of Afghanistan in return for a pledge
by Dost Mohammed two years earlier to "be the friend of
the friends and enemy of the enemies of the Honourable
1 0
East India Company." The Treaty drafted in 1857 added 
an award of one lakh of rupees per month and 400 muskets 
to the Amir for the duration of his war with Persia to 
reclaim the city of Herat. Dost Mohammed agreed to 
receive British officials to supervise the distribution 
of the grant at locations where his army met to attack 
Persia. The British promised to prohibit involvement of 
their representatives in either the direction of the 
Afghan army or the country's internal matters. They also 
agreed to remove their officials at the end of the hostil­
ities with Persia but would retain the right to send a 
non-European vakeel (agent) to the Amir's court at Kabul
^D. P. Singhal, India and Afghanistan 1876-1907:
^ Study in Diplomatic Rela t ionll TSt. Lucia: Queens limd: 
University of Queens land , 1963) 7.
10Treaty between the British government and His 
Highness Ameer Dost Mohammed Khan, 30 March 1855 in Great 
Britain, Parliament, Sessional Papers, L V I , AfghahTstan 
(1878), "Correspondence Respecting the Relations between 
the British government and that of Afghanistan since the 
Accession of the Ameer Shere Ali Khan, 375.
and possibly one to Peshawar. Article 11 clearly speci­
fied that this Treaty supplemented but did not supplant 
the Treaty of 1 8 5 5 . ^
Dost Mohammed died in July 1863. Royal succes­
sion on the death of an Afghan ruler rarely followed in 
an orderly manner. Dost Mohammed's personal choice of 
his third son, Shere Ali, guaranteed little. War erupted 
almost immediately after his death. The British govern­
ment avoided direct acknowledgement of Shere Ali but main­
tained their vakeel at his court in case he did overcome
his elder half-brothers, Mohammed Afzal and Mohammed 
12Azim. Dost Mohammed knew the struggle that would occur
between his sons at his death and had warned the British
13against involvement. The Afghans expected these endemic
power struggles. They viewed them not as real civil war
but as the appropriate means to determine which candidate
14had the strength to rule their turbulent country.
For the next six years the British government
11 Singhal, India and Afghanistan, 195.
12 India Government to Sir Charles Wood, 28 July 
1863, i_n SP, LVI , Afghanistan (1878), 377.
13 Ibid., Memorandum by Sir John Lawrence, 434; 
Mountstuart ET Grant Duff, The Afghan Policy of the 
Beaconsf ieId Government and It's Result!! (London : The 
National Press Agency, 18 78) 6.
14M. Hasan Kakar, "A Political and Diplomatic 
History of Afghanistan in the Reign of Amir 1Abd A1 Rahman 
Khan 1880-1901" (Manuscript completed at the Center for 
Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University, 1974) 56.
recognized whichever brother seemed in control at
Kabul. Three years after the death of their father, Afzal
and Azim drove Shere Ali from Kabul to Herat where he
remained until 1868. Shere A l i 's defeat and his savage
reaction to it caused the British to express doubts both
15about his ability to regain power and his sanity. The
British played off brother against brother, hinting to
16Azim he could expect support if he held Kabul, while 
recognizing Shere Ali as Amir of Herat; a gesture
17insulting to the hereditary heir of Dost Mohammed. The
British formally acknowledged Afzal as Amir of Kabul and
Kandahar in early 1867 and requested him to submit his
acceptance of the Treaties concluded by the British with 
1 8his father. The death of Afzal in October left Azim
19as ruler in Kabul. Nevertheless, Shere Ali, in the
20summer of 1868, retook Kabul and Kandahar.
All three of Dost Mohammed's sons had approached
■^Thornton to J. W. S. Wyllie, 15 February 1867 
in SP, LVI, Afghanistan (1878), 387.
~^The Times (London), October 18, 1877.
17 Demetrius C. Boulger, Central As Ian Quest ions: 
Essays on Afghanistan, China and Central Asia (London:
T5 FisheT Unw i n , 1885) 57.
1 8 Indian Foreign Department to Cranbrook, 28 
February 1867, Ln SP, LVI, Afghanistan (1878), 386.
■^Ibid., Pollock to T. H. Thornton, 16 October 
1878, 397.
20Stephen Wheeler, The Ameer Abdur Rahman (Lon­
don: Bliss, Sands and Foster, 1895) 46-47.
21Russia for support in their internecine rivalry. Al­
though the Russians declined, Shere Ali held particular 
resentment toward the British for turning their back on 
him when he most needed encouragement. The flight of
Abdur Rahman, son of Mohammed Afzal, into Russian terri-
22tory made British approval essential to the new Amir*
The British Vakeel in Kabul relayed Shere Ali's complaint 
that :
. . . from the British Government I have received
comparatively no friendship or kindness with 
reference to my suecess in this miserable civil 
war, until God almighty of his own favour has 
again ^ s t o w e d  upon me the country of my inheri­
tance .
The wavering policy of the British toward Afghan­
istan resulted from a wish to 'put their nickles in the 
right basket' Their indecision succeeded, however, only 
in alienating the Afghans. An article in the Fortnightly 
Review, ascribed a policy it dubbed "masterly inactivity"
to Sir John Lawrence, Viceroy of india from 18.64 to 
2 41869. Opponents of Lawrence accused him of refusing
^ The Times (London), October 19, 1877.
22 Mohammed Ali, Afghanis tan (The Mohammedza i 
Period: A Political History of Afghanistan From the 
Begi nning oT the TTth Century, with Empha s is on Fore ign 
Re I a t ions ) ~T Lahore": Punjab Educational Press , *~T 959 j 70T
2 3Translation of a Letter From the British Vakeel 
at Kabul to the Commissioner of Peshawar, September, 1868, 
in SP, LVI, Afghanistan (1878), 416.
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to interfere in Afghanistan under any circumstances ir
25order to maintain the status q u o . For this reason
"masterly inactivity" took on an increasingly pejorative
connotation. In spite of its reputation, Lawrence's
approach did not exclude all advances to the Kabul Govern
m e n t . For instance, when Shere Ali had secured Kabul and
Kandahar, Lawrence provided Shere Ali an urgently needed
grant of 60,000 to keep the Amir's troops faithful and
2 6to "bribe the other side."
.Lord Mayo succeeded Lawrence as Viceroy of India
in December 1868. Shortly after his arrival in India he
invited Shere Ali to Amballa to discuss the future rela-
27tionship between Afghanistan and Britain. At the first
meeting on 27 March the participants conferred on a poten
tial trade agreement. The British reiterated their
promise to leave the internal concerns of Afghanistan to 
2 8its ruler. The Conference at Amballa -formulated an 
"intermediate" policy. The British offered friendship
2 5Munawwar Khan, Anglo-Afghan Re la t ions 1798- 1878 
A Chapter in the Great Game (Peshawar: University Book 
A g e n c y , T 9 W )  89; Ram Si Rastogi, Indo-Af ghan Re la t ions 
1880-1900 (Lucknow: Nay. Jyoti Press, 1965) TO IT.
2 6Frederick Sleigh Roberts, Forty-One Years in 
India: From Subaltern to Commander-in-Chief^ II (L ondon: 
Richard Bentley and SorT7 1897) 45.
2 7
Memorandum by T. H. Thornton to W. S. Seton- 
K a r r , 9 March 1869, in SP, LVI, Afghanistan (1878),
460-61.
2 8Ibid., India Foreign Department to the Duke of 
A r gyl, 3 AprTT 1869, 462.
£40
and support to the Amir, hinted at possible money and arms
subsidies dependent, however, on their discretion, and
mollified his fears concerning Russian movement near his
northern borders. They refused, however, either to
establish a fixed subsidy or to acknowledge formally his 
29chosen heir. The meetings at Amballa accomplished 
little more than a restatement of the Treaties of 1855 
and 1857 .
The outcome of the Amballa Conference profoundly
disillusioned the Amir. His original offer to go all the
way to Calcutta to meet with British representatives indi-
30cated he expected more. He had hoped to secure a more
binding defense treaty against the Russian threat and gain
31recognition for his heirs. Only the British promise 
not to send British (European) envoys to Afghanistan 
pleased Shere Ali. His Chief Minister Syud Nur Mohammed 
unfortunately set a dangerous precedent at the meetings 
when he commented that "...the day might come when the 
Russians would arrive, and the Amir would be glad, not 
only of British officers as agents, but of arms and troops 
to back t h e m " ^
29 Ibid., India Foreign Department to the Duke of 
Argyl, 1 July 1869 , 466.
30
Prasad, India 1s Foreign Pol icy, 122.
31 Henry B. Hanna, The^ Second Afghan War,
1878-79-80. Its Causes, Its Conduct and Its Consequences,
I mesTtrnTnster and London: Cons table and Company, 1910) 
293-94.
32 Roberts, Forty-One Years in India, 49-50
The policies which conditioned the British atti­
tude at Amballa changed slowly. Sir Henry Rawlinson, a
33prominent expert on Asian affairs, emerged as the fore­
most opponent of non-intervention. He first published 
his views in 1865 in the Quarterly Review where he argued 
Britain's prerogative to protect the route to India via 
Herat and Kandahar. While a member of the Council of 
India in 1868 Rawlinson presented a Memorandum to the 
Secretary of State in which he detailed Russian incursions 
into the Turkestan region just north of Afghanistan 
especially into the territory of Bokhara (fig. 3). The 
traditionally close relationship between the governments 
of Kabul and Bokhara, he claimed, permitted him to specu­
late on the possible ramifications of a Russian presence 
in Bokhara. He particularly feared Russian agitation of 
the Moslem animosity toward India. He concluded that 
further neglect of Afghanistan would encourage Russian 
access to Kabul. Rawlinson urged the India government 
to end its policy of vacillation, openly support Shere 
Ali with subsidies and send a European envoy to the Amir's 
Court. In short, he recommended a return to the 
quasi-protectorate status Britain had maintained in 
Afghanistan in the 1 8 5 0 ' s . ^
33 Fletcher, Highway of Conquest, 117.
34
Memorandum on the Central Asian Question to the 
Government of India by the Secretary of State, 21 August 
1868, in SP, LVI Afghanistan (1878), 405-13.
The India government rejected Rawlinson*s pro­
posals. Lawrence defended his restraint during the war
between Dost Mohammed’s sons by recalling the Amir's own
3 5advice before his death. He conceded the acceleration 
of Russian movement in Central Asia but discounted Brit­
ain's right to challenge it until the threaL became 
direct. Active involvement in Afghanistan might lead to
occupation - a circumstance those who remembered the first
3 6war ardently hoped to avoid. He did not believe Shere 
A l i 's behavior evidenced any hostility toward Britain. On 
the contrary, the Amir frequently repeated his resolution 
to preserve the friendly relations with Britain estab­
lished by his father and promised never to seek help, from 
3 7another Power. W. H. Norman, former Secretary to the 
India Military Department, contributed two further reasons 
to veto a "forward" move into the Northwest frontier. 
First, the frontier tribes would scorn British regula­
tions. Secondly, interference surely would arouse the
independence of the tribes and cause considerable fric- 
38t ion .
35 Ibid., Memorandum by Sir John Lawrence, 434.
36 Ibid., Government of India to the Duke of A r g y l , 
4 January 1869, 417-19.
37 Ibid., Memorandum on Paper by Sir Henry Rawlin­
son on Centra 1 Asian Progress of Russia, 421.
38 Ibid., Minute on the Subject of the Progress 
of Russia TL Central Asia, and of the Defense of Our 
North-West Frontier by W. H. Norman, 8 December 1868, 444.
Extensive debate on the security of the Northwest
Frontier developed in London as well as India. Those who
previously favored non-intervention now advised a slight
relaxation of that policy in the form of subsidies to
39
Shere Ali to confirm the Treaties of 1855 and 1857.
Rawlinson's recommendations found new supporters in
Par1iament.^  Reactivation of a proposition by General
John Jacob in the 1860s, produced an argument which occu-
pied military advisors for a number of years. Jacob,
Frere and Rawlinson suggested engineering the border areas
into a more "scientic" frontier, one with all major
/ ^
inroads secured as the best line of defense. That would 
involve troops at all the strategic mountain passes and 
require the good will of the border tribes along the way.
Sir Robert Sandeman was the "man-on-the-spot" most 
directly responsible for replacing the old "close border" 
system with open involvement in the affairs of the border
39 John Dacosta, A Scientific Frontier: or, The 
Danger of a Russian Invasion of India (London: WT ITT Allen 
and Company,~1891) 5-6 .
4 0 TK • i r Ibid., 6.
41
C. Collin Davies, The Problem of the North-West 
Frontier, 1890- 19 0 8 , wi th A Survey of the~Policy Since 
1849 (Cambridge University Press, 1W32; reprint e d ., Lon- 
d o n : Curzon Press, 1974) 8.
42 Ibid., 16; William P. Andrew, India and Her 
Neighbors (London: William H. Allen and Company, 1878)
43tribes. The British had sent Sandeman to Biluchistan 
to arbitrate in the continual tribal conflicts which made 
travel there extremely dangerous. He concluded a treaty 
with the Khan of Kelat at Jacobabad on 8 December 1876 
which made Quetta, its surrounding area and the Bolan pass 
a British leasehold (fig. 2). The Khan continued as its 
nominal ruler but the India government took over super­
vision of the region. Since the eighteenth century Amirs
of Kabul had exercised a degree of authority over Quetta,
44one of the most strategic spots in Biluchistan. Sande­
man' s influence there caused Shere Ali apprehension about
the future intentions of the British. British occupation
45of Quetta alarmed the Russian government as well. The
Marquis of Salisbury, Secretary of State for India,
instructed the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg to
remind the Russian Government of an 1854 Treaty with the
Khan of Kelat which permitted them to locate troops in
4 6his territory.
A Memorandum by Sir Bartle Frere in 1876 drew the
43 Richard Isaac Bruce, The Forward Policy and Its 
Re suits or Thlrty-F ive Y e a r s ' Work Among sT the Tribes on 
Our lMor tlv^Wes t ern TrontTer of India ( London *. Longmans, 
Green and C o m p a n y , 1900) Z-3T
44 Davies, The Problem of the North-Wes t Frontier,
45
Loftus to the Earl of Derby, 30 March 1875 i_n 
SP, LXXX , Central Asia No. 1 (1878), "Correspondence 
Respecting Central Asia," 479.
46 Ibid., Sir L. Mallet to Lord Tenterdon, 3 May
1875, 479.
attention of the British government to the Sind and Punjab 
areas of western India. Frere criticized the frontier 
policy for permitting the men there to bear arms and 
resolve their own disputes. The people of the Sind and 
Punjab acknowledged the Amir of Kabul as their nominal 
ruler, although their affairs fell under the influence 
of the British in India. The Indian government had recog­
nized neither the Amir's authority nor had it impressed 
its own control. Frere felt that the Indian government
must place the regions directly under its jurisdiction
47to properly protect the frontier. Shortly after, the
Viceroy announced the placement of parts of the Sind
(Jacobabad, Thool and Kusmore) under the Governor of the 
48Punjab. The Secretary of State supported the decision
of the Viceroy and his Council because the tribes along
49the frontier severely limited trade.
The British had constructed a number of semi-inde­
pendent states along the Northwest frontier of India by 
1857 (fig 2). They provided these states with security 
and mediation for their frequent feuds in exchange for
47 Memorandum by Sir Bartle Frere on the Sind and 
Punjab Frontier Systems, 1876 in SP, LVIII, Biluchistan 
No. 3 "Papers Relating to the Reorganization of the 
Western and North-Western Frontier of India," 26-27.
48 Ibid., Proclamation, India Foreign Department,
1876, 20.
49 Ibid., Despatch From the Secretary of State for 
India to the Viceroy in Council, 23 March 1877, 7.
their l o y a l t y . ^  Most Indian officials believed that the
new frontier policy successfully reduced both the number
51and the effects of disputes in the border a r eas. In
contrast, reliable sources indicated that bribery, more
52often than mediation, quieted intra-tribal conflicts.
The possible suspicions British involvement mighl generat
in the minds of native rulers produced criticism of the
policy. Indeed, such relationships with the British
government in neighbouring territories had led inevitably
53to total annexation.
The growing Russian presence in Central Asia pre­
cipitated the increased British commitment on the Indian 
frontier (fig 3). British assessment of Russian inten­
tions varied widely. Many observers saw Russia's moves 
as the natural reaction to the "force of circumstances;" 
a concept shared and similarly acted upon by the 
British. The Russians had the same right as the British 
to subdue the 'barbarous' peoples on their frontiers, 
member of the House of Commons, hearing of the Russian
"^Prasad, India's Fore ign Pol icy, 256.
51 A d y e , Indian Frontier Policy, 25.
52
Sir George Campbell, "The Afghan Frontier: Sub­
stance of a Speech Not Delivered" (London: Edward Stan­
ford, Printed for Private Circulation, 1879) 47.
53 The Duke of Argyl , The Eastern Question: From 
the Treaty of Paris 1856 to the Treaty of Berl in 187.8 , 
and to the Second Afghan (Tar CLondon: Strahan and Company 
L t d .~ n .d .) 225 .
suppression of Khiva said he hoped they would now see
..this nest of robbers, those scourges of humanity,
reduced to order and civilization.""^ A game of chess
ensued in which each Russian move provoked a counter-
55advance by Britain. The difference between the policies 
of Russia and Great Britain, as perceived by the British, 
lay in the habit of the St. Petersburg government to deny 
positively an intended maneuver until it became a fait 
accompli. Russian insincerety created an almost manic 
fear in some British minds. The British believed the 
Russian government allowed their Central Asian officers 
a much wider latitude than did the British. An article 
in Blackwood’s Magazine claimed that the Russian Govern­
ment knew little about the actual activities of their
representatives in Central Asia and often learned of
' 56aggressions via the British Foreign Office. Substantial
evidence suggested that once a Russian official subjugated
^^Bouchier Wrey Savile, How India Was Won By 
England Under Clive and Hastings (Xondon: Hodder and 
Stoughton^ T89T1 Z89I
^^Asghar H. Bilgrami, Afghani s tan and Bri t i sh 
India 1793-1907: A Study in Foreign Relations (New D e l h i : 
Sterling Publishers (P ) L tcT.~ 1972) 1 6 9 ; See also: Archi­
bald R. Colquhoun, Russia Against India: The Struggle for 
Asia (London: Harper and Brothers, 1900) 161; Savile, How 
India Was W o n , 289; Percy M. Sykes, Sir Mortimer Durand‘S 
A Biography TLondon: Cassell and Company” L t d ., 1926) 80; 
W a r d , The Cambridge History of Bri tish Foreign Pol i c y ,
c r
"The Afghan War and Its Authors," Blackwood 1 s 
Magazine, January 1879.
an area, the Government acceded. In the event of a mis­
carriage, it disavowed all knowledge of the officer’s 
57plans. Another opinion circulated that the Russian 
government frequently sent officers "under a cloud" to 
Central Asia. As a result, the officers turned the advan­
tages of distance and turmoil in the khannates of Central
58Asia into a means of redemption.
Conservative Party members exploited the Russian
threat to force through bills Parliament normally would
59have rejected. They excited feeling with accusations
of apathy which aroused the tendency of the British public
to see Russia as their traditional enemy as they had
6 0France for so long. They easily found support in people
who had heard repeatedly that Russia longed for the wealth 
61of India. Opponents argued that Russia would not
Great Britain, Parliament, Hansard * s Parliamen­
tary Debates, CCXLII, 505; Curzon, Russia in Central A s i a , 
31 6  — IT-; Reinsch, Colonial Government  ^ 54 .
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Krausse, Russia In A s i a : A Record and A Study 1558-1899 
(New York: Henry- HoTt and- Company, 18990 134-35T
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lished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 
1974) 467-68.
6 0W. E. Baxter, England and Russia in Asia (Lon­
don: Swan Sonnenschein and Company, 1885) ITT
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attempt an invasion of India because the great distance 
and rugged terrain made provisioning an army nearly impos­
sible. Nor would the Indian peoples accept the Russians
6 2since the reforms following the 1857 Mutiny.
The Russian .siege of Tashkend in 1865 sounded the
initial alarm in the British camp (fig. 3). The Russian
Foreign Minister Prince Gortchakov issued a circular in
reply to British queries in which he denied that Russia
intended any major annexations in Central Asia. He
assured the British Russia would continue their policy
of deference to the integrity of Afghanistan and 
6  3Persia. The Russian campaign at Tashkend so disturbed 
the Amir of Bokhara, however, that he imprisoned the Rus­
sian agent sent to explain the o p e r a t i o n . ^
The Russians successfully subdued Tashkend in 
1867, Samarcand in 1868, and reestablished their dominance 
in Bokhara (fig. 3). The British government continued
to accept Russian assurances of respect for Afghan inde- 
6  5pendence. They did request their representative at St. 
Petersburg, however, to remind the Russian Government that
6 2Curzon, Russia in Central A s i a , II, 319,
323-325; Krausse, Russ ia in As i a , T63T
6  3Boulger, Central Asian Questions, 166.
6 4 Ibid., 172-73.
6  S
Gortchakov to Brunnow, 14 February 1869 in SP, 
LXXV, Central Asia No. 2 (1873), "Correspondence 
Respecting Central Asia," 713.
^t could prove very difficult to control its representa­
tives who were a great distance from the capital. Lord 
Clarendon, British Foreign Secretary, recalled how in 
India," there was always some frontier to be
improved, some broken engagement to be repaired, some
faithless ally to be punished; and plausible reasons were
6  6seldom wanting for the acquisition of territory." Rus­
sia might find herself in a similar position - "however 
unwillingly .
The increase of Russian activity in Central Asia 
provoked the British by the spring of 1869 to suggest a 
formal agreement concerning Afghanistan. The Russian 
government initially proposed that they regard Afghanistan 
as a buffer zone between the two Empires. The inade­
quately delimited borders of Afghanistan, however, made 
it unsuitable. The Council of India recommended the upper 
Amu Darya (Oxus) as the southernmost limit of Russian ter­
ritory and Khiva as the neutral zone. Russia disagreed 
on the grounds that the Khan of Khiva would act belli-
gernaly towards them thinking he had become immune to
6 8their interference. The Russian Imperial government 
also admitted that it did not trust the Government of
6 6Ibid., Clarendon to Arthur Buchanon, 27 March 
1869, 713. '
67tk.a Ibid .
6 8Ibid., Clarendon Co Horace Rumbold, 17 April
1869, 713.
India to carry out the Home government's policies. A l
St. Petersburg Arthur Buchanon guaranteed the Russians
the Viceroy could not authorize major enterprises without
the permission of his superiors in London. Nonetheless,
he added, a Russian troop movement into Afghanistan no
doubt would arouse the British public to demand a new
69policy towards Russia. Gortchakov insisted his Govern­
ment acted solely in defense of their commercial interests 
in Central A s i a . ^  Moreover, he claimed the Emperor would
return Samarcand to the Amir of Bokhara as soon as 
71viable. Rumor reached the British in late November of
a planned Russian expedition against Khiva, the projected 
72neutral zone. Once again the Prince stoutly denied the 
report.
A rift between the Amirs of Kabul and Bokhara over 
the areas of Badakshan and Wakhan disturbed the progress 
of negotiations between Russia and Britain. Dost Mohammed 
had annexed Badakshan in 1859 (fig. 1). At his death in 
1863 the Amir of Badakshan approached Bokhara for assis­
tance in gaining independence from Kabul. The Amir of
69
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713.
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71 Ibid., Buchanon to Clarendon, 2 November 1869,
713.
72 Ibid., Buchanon to Clarendon, 18 November 1869,
713.
Bokhara refused but friction between Badakshan and Kabul 
73continued. The Russian government pressed for a reas-
74sessment of the relationship. Viceroy Mayo, in January
of 18 70, received information that Bokhara planned to
invade Badakshan. He urged the Government to ask Russia
75to stop the invasion. He learned the following day that
7 6Bokharan troops had retired but relations between Kabul 
and Bokhara further weakened because both sheltered poli­
tical rivals of the other. Refuge to Abdur Rahman by the 
Amir of Bokhara particularly annoyed Shere A l i . ^  The 
Russian government responded by instructing their Governor
of Tashkend, General Kaufmann, to behave according to the
7 8agreement with the British on Afghanistan.
Kaufmann wrote to Shere Ali explaining that Abdur
79Rahman's presence at Tashkend implied no threat. The 
message greatly troubled the Amir. He told the British 
Vakeel he could not understand why a Russian would
7 3
Ibid., 1 December 1869, 713; Buchanon to Claren­
don, 29 December 1869, 713.
^ Ibid, Forsyth to Buchanon, 5 November 1869, 713.
^ I b i d . ,  Viceroy to Duke of Argyl, 23 January 
1870, 713.
7 6 Ibid., Viceroy to Duke of Argyl, 24 January
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713.
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79 Literal Translation of Letter from Kauffman to 
Ameer, in SP, L X X X , Central Asia No. 1 (1878), 636.
communicate directly with him given his protective friend­
ship with the British; especially as this particular Rus­
sian official harbored his most bitter enemy. He refused 
to reply without the advice of the British govern-
Q Q
m e n t . Aitchison, the India government’s Foreign Depart­
ment Chief, thought Kaufmann1s letter duplicitous. He 
recommended they request the Russian government to forbid 
the Governor to communicate directly with Shere Ali. Lord
Mayo disagreed, however, and advised the Amir to answer
81Kaufman -in a conventional manner. The Amir complied 
but remained apprehensive about Russian designs on his 
hard won kingdom.
The British government settled on an acceptable 
boundary for northern Afghanistan in 1872. Badakshan and 
Wakhan constituted the northeastern limits of Afghanis­
tan. In the northwest the line consisted of the area 
along the Amu Darya known as Afghan Turkestan. To the 
extreme northwest they included A k s h a , Seripool, Maimana, 
Shiburghan and Andhoi in the territory of the Amir of
Kabul. The desert lands there remained in the hands of
8 2the independent Turcomans. The Russian government
^ I b i d . ,  Major Pollock to Mr. Thornton, 26 May 
1870, 634.
81 Ibid., Viceroy to Ameer Shere Ali Khan, 24 June, 
1870, 63 3. K h a n , A Chapter i n the Grea t G a m e , 159-60.
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Granville to Loftus, 17 October 1872 rn SP,
L X X V , Central' Asia (1872), 693.
objected to the inclusion of Badakshan. General Kaufman
advised that the formal placement of Badakshan and Wakhan
under the sovereignty of the Amir of Kabul would threaten
the neighboring khannates; especially Khokand. This path,
he warned, "would lead him [Shere Ali] straight into
83collision with Russia."
The British and Russian governments did agree that
the Amu Darya beginning at its junction with the Kokcha
and running to Khodja Saleh (fig. 1) delineated the
84-northern' boundary of Afghanistan. Differences over
Badakshan and Wakhan persisted until Prince Gortchakov,
in early 1873, concluded that the British superior means
to obtain accurate information made this a "question of
detail." England's support of Shere Ali, both material
and moral, assured him the Amir would behave as the Brit-
8  5ish counseled. The Border Agreement of 1 January 1872
reitereated the delimitations accepted the previous year
and recognized Badakshan and Wakhan as part of Afghan- 
8 6istan. In addition, the Russian Government reaffirmed
its promise to regard Afghanistan as completely beyond
o o
Ibid., Kauffman to Gortchakov, 29 November 1872, 
693; Gortchakov to Brunnow, 7 December 1872, 693.
84 Ibid., Gortchakov to Brunnow, 7 December 1872,
693.
8  5Ibid., Gortchakov to Brunnow, January 1873, 692.
8 6S. S. Thorburn, Asiatic Neighbours (London: 
William Blackwood and Sons^ 1894) 112-13.
the limits of its influence.
Russia annexed all of the right bank of the Khan-
88nate of Khiva precisely six months later. The British
did not greet the subjugation of Khiva with a great deal
of alarm. On several occasions the Khan of Khiva had
imprisoned and executed Russian citizens and in other ways
89outrageously defied his powerful northern neighbor. The
takeover had significance, however, because Khiva domi-
90nated the Amu Darya; a fact which reminded Shere Ali
91that Rus.sia had as much power as Britain. Russia sub­
dued Khokand in 1873, completing control over Russian 
92Turkestan. Only the Amu Darya separated Afghanistan 
from Russian dependencies (fig. 3).
The British government reserved the right to med­
iate in any dispute between Persia and Afghanistan in con­
formity with a treaty between Britain and Persia ir
8  7William Habberton, Anglo-Russian Relations 
Concerning Aghanistan, 1837-190/ fUrbana: Universi ty of 
Illinois P r e s s , 193 7) 32-33.
8 8George Bruce Malleson, History of Afghanistan 
From the Earliest Period to the Outbreak oT the War of 
18 78 (London : W. H~ A1len- and Company, T8 T 8 ) 436”
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931857. Lord Mayo persuaded Shere Ali to permit the
delimitation by a British commission of a boundary between
Afghanistan and Persia; the controversial Sistan desert 
94region* The Commission, led by Major-General Fredrick
Goldsmid, arrived in March 1872. Persia and Afghanistan
had exchanged portions of the Sistan for years. The
Persians had moved east as far as the Helmand river after
95the death of Dost Mohammed. The assassination of Lord 
Mayo in February 1872 left the new Viceroy, Lord North­
brook, to deal with the Commission's decision. Northbrook: 
arranged a meeting with the Afghans at Simla in July 1873 
to explain the outcome of the border inquiry and also to
answer the Amir's questions about British defense plans
96in the face of Russian advances. British representa­
tives assured Shere Ali's Envoy, Syud Nur Mohammed, they 
trusted Russia to abide by its agreement to refrain from 
interference in Afghanistan. They then acquainted him 
with the Goldsmid Award. Persia would retain a small
island surrounded by the Hamun and Helmand rivers but no
97territory east of the Helmand. The Commission awarded
93 Prasad, India 1 s Foreign Pol icy , 59.
94 Mohammed Ali, The Mohammedzai Period, 74.
95 Prasad, India's Foreign Pol i c y , 57, 59.
Qfi
Viceroy to Secretary of State , 24 July 18-73 in 
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97 Government of India, Foreign Department A Col­
lection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads, Re latTngto 
India ~ancT~ Nelghbouring Countries, cOmpi 1. ed by C . \T.
Aitchison, XIII, (Central Publication Branch, 1933) 210.
to Afghanistan a 100 mile strip of land along the east
bank of the Helmand. The Award pleased neither party.
The Persians had hoped to keep land acquired east of the
river, while the Afghans felt all the Sistan rightfully
98belonged to them. The decision made plain to Shere Ali
that Anglo-Afghan interests dovetailed only when it served
9 9the interests of the British. The Amir began to reeval­
uate his foreign relations. The British also gave Shere 
Ali ten lakhs of rupees, 15,000 Enfield and 5,000 Snider 
rifles. He demonstrated his new skepticism by refusing 
to withdraw the money from the Kohat treasury where the 
British deposited i t . ^ ^  The British Government had 
ignored his expressions of fear, showed him no favor in 
return for his subservience in foreign matters and, so 
far, offered him no permanent remuneration. Russian com­
munications expressed a very friendly attitude. Shere 
Ali well may have felt he could profit more directly in 
the short run from an association with Russia.
Shortly after the Simla meeting, Shere Ali
announced the designation of his younger son, Abdulla Jan, 
101as his heir. Yakub Khan, his elder son, had revolted
98
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^■^Grants to the Ameers, 3 March 1882 in SP 
XLVIII, Afghanistan, 449-51.
101 Boulger, Central Asian Questions, 187.
against him several years earlier, fled to the Sistan and
captured Herat. Father and son reunited a year later and
the Amir, on Lord Mayo's advice, made Yakub Governor of 
102H e r a t . Yakub returned to Kabul as soon as he heard
of his brother's selection as heir. Shere Ali imprisoned
103him in fear he would lead a second revolt. ' At the time 
of the reconciliation between Shere Ali and his son, Gen­
eral Kaufmann wrote expressing pleasure but also assuring
104the Amir he understood his position. He wrote again
at the nomination of Abdullah Jan to congratulate Shere
105Ali on his decision. Lord Northbrook, on the contrary,
advised the Amir to observe the terms of the petition to
come to Kabul made by Yakub in order that the Amir m i g h t ,
"maintain his good name and the friendship of the British 
106government." The coercive nature of Northbrook's note
made the flowery accolades of Kaufmann very attractive. 
Shere A l i , very aware of the problems of securing a throne 
in Afghanistan, realized the need for a strong ally for 
his successor. The British did not appear inclined to 
offer that support.
102
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Foreign Secretary, Calcutta to Deputy Commis­
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The Amir continued to treat the British as his
protector. Reports of a Russian plan to invade Merv (fig.
3) provoked him once again to complain to the British.
The British government subtly suggested to the Russian
that an attack on Merv might precipitate their interfer- 
107ence. Prince Gortchakov denied the report. He did
admit, however, that continued harassment by the Merv
108Turcomans would necessitate disciplinary measures. The
Russians clearly did not intend to practice non-interven­
tionist policies in their frontier regions. Their actions 
required serious reassessment in London.
The British government chose not to interfere on 
behalf of any of Dost Mohammed's sons in their struggle 
to win dominance at Kabul. Thus it was chance which made 
Shere Ali the victor. Strategic and economic forces 
obviously played a decisive role in the gradual moderation 
of Britain's reticent approach toward Afghanistan. Indi­
vidual personalities within the government provided the 
impetus for all these policies. Lord Lawrence based his 
policy of non-interference on personal beliefs and experi­
ences. In the same way, Rawlinson and Frere advocated 
a more aggressive approach. The relative freedom enjoyed 
by the India government within the structure of the
1 07
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British Civil Service made possible its initial disregard 
of criticisms by the "Forward Party." Their success in 
making Afghanistan a political issue, thus drawing in the 
public, forced the government to alter slightly its pre­
ferred policy. The "victim" responded with some skepti­
cism but also a great deal of hope.
CHAPTER IV
LORD LYTTON AND THE FORWARD POLICY
Disraeli's conservative government replaced the 
Gladstone Ministry in 1874. The parochial tendencies of
i
the Liberals yielded to a Government which openly culti-
2
vated the Empire and its management. Disraeli's allu­
sions to Lord Salisbury’s Russophobia convinced the Queen 
to accept his nomination as Secretary of State for 
India. Salisbury, soon after taking office, instructed 
Northbrook to raise the question of sending British agents
3
to Kabul. Salisbury believed native agents could not 
provide the information necessary for efficient and pro­
ductive relations. He questioned the effect of personal 
and religious prejudices on the selection of information 
reported. Consequently, he directed the Viceroy to 
arrange for the reception of a British Agent at Herat, 
possibly also at Kandahar, but not at Kabul because of
1
Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victor-
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' 4the "fanatic violence" there.
On receipt of Salisbury's instructions, Northbrook 
posted a despatch explaining that he and his Council felt 
the time not yet propitious to insist on the reception 
of a British official in Afghanistan. Salisbury agreed 
to a three to four month postponement. Northbrook delayed 
his final recommendation for nearly five months while he 
and his Council deliberated. He informed the Secretary 
in June that in their opinion the Vakeel furnished reli­
able and adequate information. No concrete evidence 
existed of Shere A l i 's amenability to a European agent. 
Northbrook concluded that the animosity of Shere A l i 's 
subjects made the proposal too dangerous even if the Amir 
personally agreed .
The Viceroy, his Council and other India officials 
supported the Vakeel's contention that he fulfilled his 
function as well as possible. The Vakeel, Atta Mohammed, 
explained he provided a complete account of events in 
Afghanistan but the Government had not asked him tc 
analyse these events nor did he consider it prudent to 
include confidential facts in written correspondence.
4Salisbury to Governor-General of India, 22 Jan­
uary 1875 in Great Britain, Parliament, Sessional Papers, 
LVI , AfghanTstan (1878), "Correspondence Respecting the 
Relations Between the British Government and that of 
Afghanistan Since the Accession of The Ameer Shere Ali 
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Northbrook forwarded Atta Mohammed's statement to Salis­
bury adding his and his Council's agreement on the fruit­
lessness of reporting the many rumors which freely cir­
culated in Afghanistan.^ Salisbury, without consulting 
his Council, disregarded these protests and ordered North-
g
brook to comply with his original orders. The Amir
steadily expressed alarm about Russia. The British must
wait no longer to take advantage of his willingness to 
9
cooperate. Salisbury's actions, although somewhat ques­
tionable', were not unusual. He frequently neglected to 
inform his Council of business because he preferred to
work in this cryptic manner. Because of this and other
10tensions between himself and Salisbury, Northbrook
11resigned the Viceroyalty in early 1876.
Disraeli appointed Robert Lytton to the Vice­
royalty, a man who confessed little knowledge about the 
Indian Empire but who enthusiastically endorsed the
^Hanna, The Second Afghan W a r , 90.
g
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Government's new assertive foreign policies. The choice
of Lytton, by nature impetuous, seemed an odd one to many
observers. A year later Disraeli wrote to Salisbury that:
. . . had it been a routine age we might have
made...a more prudent selection, but we foresaw 
what would occur, and indeed saw what was 
occuring; and we wanted a man of ambition, imagi- 
nati<j)i^ , some vanity, and much will — and we got 
h i m .
Salisbury delivered instructions to Lytton prior 
to the new Viceroy's departure for India. He explained 
that Lytton must move to strengthen the weakened condition 
of British influence in Afghanistan. He directed him to 
find a legitimate but minor reason to send a temporary 
mission to the Amir to demonstrate the British govern­
ment's concern for his anxieties and to offer him support 
against external dangers. Lytton must convince Shere Ali 
of the necessity for maintenance of British agents at 
effective observation points. Salisbury suggested Lytton 
send the mission on the pretense of announcing the Queen's 
assumption of the title Empress of India. The Secretary 
authorized the Viceroy to arrange subsidies to Shere Ali 
in return for his acceptance of a legation. He cautioned 
Lytton, however, against making any fixed financial agree­
ments. Salisbury also empowered the Viceroy to assure 
Shere Ali the British would recognize de facto rulers and
12Singhal, India and Afghanistan, 1
"^Buckle, Pi sraeli , 379.
would support him against unprovoked external intimida^
14tion .
Several letters written by Lytton in his first
months as Viceroy revealed his analysis of the situation
in Afghanistan. While still on board ship to India he
wrote to Bartle Frere that he generally agreed on the
impracticality of the current border arrangement. But
he did not feel prepared to require Shere Ali to accept
a permanent legation at Kabul. On the other hand, Lytton
conjectured, if the Amir rejected a mission, the Govern-
15ment would know where it stood with him. In a letter
to the British Resident at Nepal he offered his conviction 
that the non-interventionist policies of former Govern­
ments had reduced British influence on both the Northwest 
Frontier and in Afghanistan. The vulnerability of Afghan­
istan's geographical position necessitated the protection 
of one of the two great Powers it separated. The British 
must take steps to keep it from falling under Russian 
hegemony. He would not insist on a permanent British 
agent at Shere Ali's Court because he felt Herat more 
strategically located. The British could not guarantee 
aid against aggression unless they could keep an envoy
14 Salisbury to Government of India, 28 February 
18/6 in Great Britain, India Miscellaneous Public Docu­
ments^ Political and Secret Despatches to India, B.P. 7/6, 
II, 9-lBE
"^Lytton to Frere, 26 March 1876 in India Office 
Library, Lytton Collection, "Letters Despatched," Mss Eur 
E 218, 43^5U1
at Herat. The new Viceroy agreed that "one hand washes
another" but he felt that "it is now time for the Ameer
16to shew [sic] us some of his soap." In a letter to his
friend John Morley, Lytton metaphorically described the
old policy a s :
. . . putting all our eggs into one basket; pub­
licly proclaiming that, if those eggs are broken, 
we cannot make an omelette; and taking no precau­
tion whatevejyto keep this precious basket under 
Our own arm.
Lytton began taking those precautions almost
immediately after his arrival in Calcutta. He dispatched
his native aide-de-camp, Ressaldar Khanam Khan, to Kabul
to advise Shere Ali of his plan to send Sir Lewis Pelly
18to Kabul or to a place suggested by the Amir. Shere
Ali acknowledged the new Viceroy but rejected the proposal
for a meeting in Afghanistan because he considered the
agreement reached at Simla in 1873 adequate. He did agree
to send an envoy to commit these arrangements tc 
19paper. A letter from the British Vakeel accompanied 
the Amir's clarifying Shere All's motives for refusal. He 
could not insure protection of Europeans in his country
16 Philips, The Evolution of India and Pakistan,
449.
17 Balfour, Persona I and Li terary Le t ters, II, 29.
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19 Ameer of Cabul to Commissioner of Peshawawr,
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and acceptance of a British mission would demand he
20receive a Russian.
The Amir had sound reasons to resist a British
mission. His people harbored intense hostility toward
the British resulting from their interference in Afghanis-
21tan in the 1830s. Factions opposed to Shere Ali and
his friendship with the British might easily cause trouble
22in hopes of creating a rift. The British assured the
Amir, however, that the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1873
would prevent the Russians from demanding reception of
a mission. The Amir doubted British reliance on the word
of the Russian Government. If they trusted it they would
23not be so anxious to send a deputation to him. Finally, 
the Amir feared a British agent might interfere in his 
business by attempting to mediate for disaffected 
Afghans. He had seen this happen in the Indian States 
and did not wish such a f a t e .^
A few British officials did appreciate the extrem­
ity of the Afghan aversion to European Agents. Major- 
General J. Low had written in 1857 that a successful
2 0 Ibid., British Agent Cabul to Commissioner of 
Peshawar, 22 May 1876, 549.
21 Burne, British Agent s , ,
^ H a n n a , The Second Afghan W a r , I, 133.
2 3 Ibid., 85.
24Ibid., 88.
British mission to Afghanistan could not happen until all
Afghans who remembered the events of 1838-40 had 
23died. Even then their children kept the memory
alive. The Afghan Chief Minister Syud Nur Mohammed's
reflection when reminded of his ill-fated comment at Simla
illustrated the gravity of the situation. He wrote, "it
2 6was as much as an order for my death."
The British attempted to overcome Shere Ali's
excuses by requesting several of his British acquaintances
clarify their position and stress the advantages of a mis- 
2 7sion to him. Syud Nur Mohammed replied, however, that
the Amir would not receive British agents, that former
Viceroys had promised the British would not require it
and all conscientious British officials advised against
2 8such a demand.
In early July the Commissioner of Peshawar 
informed Shere Ali of Lytton's refusal to accept an Afghan 
envoy in lieu of a British delegation to Kabul. He 
exhorted the Amir not to force the Viceroy to consider 
Afghanistan "a State which has voluntarily isolated itself
25 Canning Minute - Minute by the Honorable Major- 
General J. Low, February 1857, in SP, LVI, Afghanistan 
(1878), 751-52.
^ E a s t w i c k ,  Ly t ton , 43.
27 Government of India to Salisbury, 10 May 1877, 
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2 8Northbrook, Afghan Question, 3
from the alliance and support of the British Govern- 
29ment." Shere All's repeated references to assurances 
of former Viceroys did little to diminish Lytton's expec­
tancies. He now regarded the Amir" as suspicious, discon-
30tented and untrustworthy."
The Viceroy's Council did not snpport him unani­
mously. Three members ~ Sir Henry Norman, Sir Arthur
Hobhouse and Sir William Muir - disagreed with Lytton on
31the Amir's right to refuse the mission. In his notice 
of dissent Norman stated he saw nothing in the current 
state of affairs which necessitated insistance on the mis­
sion against the will of the Amir. Hobhouse agreed with
Muir on the Amir's prerogative to preserve his auton- 
32o m y . They based their dissent on the validity of the 
Amir's inability to provide adequate security. Moreover, 
insistance was fruitless unless Lytton planned to meet
33refusal with military power; an option they deprecated.
29 Commissioner of Peshawar to Ameer of C a b u l ,
July 1876, bn SP, LVI, Afghanistan (1878), 550.
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According to the rules of the Indian Civil Service, Lytton 
should have reported the dissents to the Home govern­
ment. Instead he requested Norman, Hobhouse and Muir to 
withhold their dissents until he had completed an explana­
tion of the affair. They agreed and thus the Secretary
of State received no information until nearly a year later 
34
in May 1877. By that time Sir John Strachey, Sir E.
B. Johnson and Mr. W. Stokes, all supporters of Lytton,
35had replaced his three opponents on the Council. At 
no time did the British government regard the three dis­
sents as official. Muir later published his own in order
3 6to disassociate himself from Lytton's policies.
Shere Ali replied to Lytton's July communication
after a two month delay. He again declined a British
agent and volunteered to send his representative to a con-
37venient location on the frontier. The British Vakeel 
reported concurrently the arrival of several messengers 
from General Kaufmann at Kabul. Atta Mohammed himself 
appeared at the Viceroy's headquarters at Simla on 6  
October. Shere Ali had sent him to tell the Viceroy of
34 Northbrook, Afghan Question, 41.
3 5
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his specific complaints against the British Govern- 
3 8ment. He considered Northbrook's opposition to his 
treatment of Yakub Khan in 1874 an intrusion in his per­
sonal affairs and an encouragement to his adversaries. He 
also objected to the loss of parts of the Sistan which 
rightfully belonged to Afghanistan and presents given by 
Northbrook to the Khan of Wakhan as a reward for hospi­
tality to a British commision passing through his terri­
tory. For some reason the former Viceroy had never
\ 39informed the Amir of this as was customary. Finally,
Shere Ali complained of the resolute refusal of the Brit­
ish government to conclude a satisfactory treaty of
defense or to recognize Abdulla Jan as his rightful suc- 
40c e ssor.
The Vakeel supplemented Shere A l i 's messages with 
the surprising information that the Amir had lost his 
alarm at Russia's progress in Central Asia. The Amir and 
General Kaufmann carried on a regular correspondence 
through Russian agents who had frequently visited Shere 
Ali since the British first advised him to answer the
3 8 Ibid., Government of India to Salisbury, 10 May
1877, 541.
39The Afghan Committee, Causes of the Afghan W a r , 
Being a Selection of the Papers Laid BeTore Par1lament 
( London : Chatto and-  Windus , 18 79"} 53.
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Governor's l e t t e r s . ^  Atta Mohammed may have reported 
the truth, rumor or simply what he thought Lytton wished 
to hear. In any event, the Viceroy believed the Amir had 
turned solidly toward Russia and he blamed non-interven­
tionist policies. He wrote Salisbury that the old policy
had estranged’ the Amir from "...the Power which had uncon-
42ditionally subsidized and openly protected him." The 
British had done neither of these things. They occa­
sionally had given rulers.of Afghanistan grants of money 
and munitions but had never agreed to fixed subsidies.
More significantly, they had dismissed perfunctorily the 
Amir's alarm about Russian incursions in central Asia.
The British had disappointed Shere Ali too often. He saw 
no reason to discuss further arrangements.
The British government alleged it wished to pro­
mote stability in Afghanistan. Shere Ali rejected the 
mission on the grounds it would undermine stability.
Lytton's inability to understand the Amir's predicament 
conceivably resulted from his nearly total ignorance of 
Afghan politics. The Viceroy decided the Amir relied on
the British to protect him in their own interest regard-
43less of his loyalty. He was wrong. If the Amir
4 1 Ibid., 542.
4 2 T K . ,Ibid .
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outwardly turned against Britain, Lytton would "break him 
like a reed."^^ Therefore, the British must act to remove 
the ambivalence in its relationship with Afghanistan.
Escalating hostility in Europe between Russia and 
Turkey intensified Anglo-Russian animosity. Many people 
felt the events of the Russo-Turkish war would bring
45Russia and Great Britain into a military confrontation.
The Viceroy concluded Shere Ali either would accept the
46most advantageous alliance or remain nonaligned. He 
quickly returned his native agent to Kabul armed with an 
aide memoire and an invitation for the Amir to go to Delhi 
to contract a formal alliance.^ The aide memoire des­
cribed the new policy towards Afghanistan which offered 
material assistance against unprovoked attack and the 
formal recognition of his chosen heir. In return the Amir
would allow a British agent at Herat to oversee the fron- 
48t i e r .
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Between the VTceroy and the Nawab Atta Mohammed Khan, 10 
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45
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80
Atta Mohammed arrived back in Kabul on November
1st. The Amir and his advisors pleaded, illness as an
excuse not to receive the Vakeel. Lytton suspected the
alibi because he had heard Kaufmann's agent remained at
Kabul and conferred with tire Amir on military preparations
49for use against the British. The Amir and his advisors 
sent a reply in December to the India government to 
explain their reservations. Syud Nur Mohammed reached 
Peshawar 'on 27 January 1877 ; ^  within two weeks of the 
British failure to stop armed conflict between Russia and 
T u r k e y .^
Anglo-Afghan relations had reached an impasse. 
Rectification of this sensitive state depended upon the 
outcome of the Peshawar meetings. Both sides unfortu­
nately sent representatives certain to clash. Syud Nur
Mohammed still smarted from his inability to secure a
52defensive treaty from the British in 1873 and he
strongly resented British insinuations he had encouraged
53reception of British agents in his country. Sir Lewis 
49 Ibid., Government of India to Salisbury, 10 May 
1877, p. 543; Lytton to Salisbury, 13 November 1876 in 
Confidential Prints 539, 3870, 167-68.
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Pelly, the British negotiator, had gained an unfavorable 
reputation during his years in the India government.
Local rulers greatly feared his involvement in their
• 54affairs.
The Conference at Peshawar opened with the reading 
of the Arnii's statement of objections by Syud Nur Moham­
med. The Afghan Envoy required several weeks to deliver 
the declaration because of his extreme ill-health. During 
this time Lytton received reports of military escalation 
on Afghanistan's borders and rumors that Shere Ali had
called for a jehad (holy war) against both Russia and Eng-
5 6land as enemies of Islam. A pan-Islamic movement to
eradicate western influences in the Middle East and Cen-
57tral Asia may have excited these rumors. Syud Nur
Mohammed thought the reports exaggerated the Amir's
activities but did admit that in his absence, anti-British
5 8elements could have influenced Shere Ali.
The Afghan Agent queried H. W. Bellow, Secretary 
for the Conference, about Lytton's insistence on having 
British officials in Afghanistan. This requirement raised
■^Argyl, The Eastern Question, 409.
^ G o v e r n m e n t  of India to Salisbury, in SP, LVI, 
Afghanistan (1878), 543-44.
5 6 IbiJ.. 544.
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5 8 Government of India to Salisbury, Ln SP, LVI, 
Afghanistan (1878), 544.
many doubts in the Amir's mind about British inten­
tions. In fact, the Viceroy's obstinacy had convinced 
Shere Ali that if he conceded on the question of agents, 
he ultimately would lose his independence. Syud Nur
Mohammied declared his ruler would die rather than relin-
59quish his independence. He told Pelly the presence of
any European official in his country made the Afghans fear
for their autonomy thus the Amir genuinely could not pro-
60tect British agents. Pelly argued the British could
correct these misunderstandings only by maintaining a
British representative there. The Viceroy, aware of past
misrepresentations of British designs, wished to commit
his Government to a protective alliance with the Afghan
Government. But it could be effective only if Shere Ali
permitted agents on his borders to monitor movement.
Pelly threatened that the Amir's refusal would force the
61British to fortify their own borders.
The illness of the Afghan Envoy often kept him 
from meetings and forced him to conduct business by writ­
ten communique. In one such memo to Pelly he gave his
6 2assurance the Amir did not contemplate a jehad. The 
59
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Viceroy, through Pelly, responded to the Kabul Envoy's
statements in a manner which made further discussion
pointless. He claimed he could not accept Shere A l i 's
explanations on the question of British agents. He did
not expect the Amir to accept a representative at Kabul
and had told him this. He offered a defensive treaty
which absolutely demanded British observation of the fron
tiers. This matter had been an essential prerequisite
for the Conference and Shere Ali had complied with it
6 3already w-hen he sent his Envoy. Therefore, Syud Nur 
Mohammed's lack of authority to accept this contingency 
amazed the Viceroy and rendered the Conference meaning­
less. The Treaty of 1877 did not serve as an excuse 
because the British never intended it to exist in perpet­
uity but only as a temporary assist to the Afghan govern­
ment at a difficult time. The Treaty of 1855, on the 
other hand, constituted a permanent agreement for friend­
ship. It did not commit the British to any fixed subsidy 
nor did it bind them to any restrictions. Lytton accused 
the Amir of frequent violations of this latter Treaty by 
not allowing British citizens to travel freely in Afghan­
istan and by calling for a jehad against the British in 
the frontier areas allied to them. Neither the agreement 
reached at Amballa in 1869 nor the one at Simla in 1873
6 3
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had the weight of a treaty thus did not abrogate that of 
641855. The Viceroy had every right to make demands aimed 
solely at preserving and strengthening the bonds of alli­
ance between Afghanistan and Britain. The following day 
the Afghan Agent's Secretary informed Pelly the Envoy's 
condition prevented him from answering Lytton's state­
ment. Pelly responded that it required only a yes or 
no - would he agree to the proposal to station British
officers, on Afghanistan's borders. Until he agreed they
6 5‘could make no further arrangements.
Syud Nur Mohammed died in the early hours of 26
6 6March. Lytton instructed Pelly to terminate the Confer­
ence at once because Mir A k h o r , Syud Nur Mohammed's Secre­
tary, had no powers. He also advised his representative 
to leave Peshawar as soon as possible to avert further 
complications. In the event another Afghan envoy arrived 
before he left he should explain he no longer possessed 
any jurisdiction,.^^ Meanwhile Shere Ali sent Mir, Akhor 
instructions to delay the British until his new envoy 
arrived with the authority to accept British condi­
tions if absolutely necessary. Pelly left Peshawar
64
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before the new Afghan Envoy arrived. The Viceroy next
severed all diplomatic relations with Kabul by refusing
to permit his Vakeel to return there. Such a move is
ordinarily a preliminary to war thus it greatly increased
6 8Shere A l i ’s apprehension. Perhaps more significantly, 
it also kept important, accurate information from the 
India Government
As the Conference closed, the Viceroy learned of 
an alert .given by the Amir to the people of Kandahar pro­
vince against the possibility of an attack by the Brit­
i s h ^  and of a request for aid from General K a u f m a n n . ^  
Reports of a Russian advance towards Merv (fig. 3) made 
the rumor more odious. The Russian government claimed 
it intended only a limited punitive war against the Akhal 
Turcomans who constantly raided their merchant cara­
vans. Many British officials believed, however, Russian 
exploits would end in the annexation of the whole 
region.. The acquisition of Merv would bring Russian 
territory to the borders of Afghanistan, leaving Shere
^ D u f f ,  The Afghan Policies of the British Govern­
ment , 22.
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^ T h o m s o n  to Derby, 16 April 1877 in Confidential 
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Ali's domains the only buffer between Russia and Brit-
. 72a m .
New foreign policies resulting from changes of 
government in London were not unusual in the British poli­
tical system. Rather, the effect of personalities within 
the government created the impasse with the Amir. Salis­
bury's insistence that Northbrook carry out orders strin­
gently opposed by the Government bn India, Northbrook's 
decision to resign rather than modify Salisbury's direc­
tions and Lytton's support of policies he only minimally 
understood combined to produce a situation the British 
no longer controlled. Lytton's virtual dismissal of dis­
sents filed by members of his council dramatically points 
out the significance of decisions made by the "man-on- 
the-spot" Enmity between Britain and Russia over Turkey, 
which magnified problems with Afghanistan, was only one 
of many random, unpredictable events which moved the Brit­
ish further from their non-interference policy toward 
Afghanistan.
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Thou set thy foot where England used to stand!
Thou reach thy rod forth over Indian land!
Slave of the slaves that call thee Lord
and Weak as their foul tongues who praise thee.
"The White Czar" Swinburne
Russia advanced toward Afghanistan diplomatically
as well as physically. British frontier agents learned
in August 1875 of Shere Ali's refusal to allow a group
of Russian officers accompanied by a Moslem Emissary into 
1
Afghanistan. Several days later the Moslem Envoy entered
Afghan territory without the Amir's permission. Shere
Ali reportedly notified his border officials to permit
the man to proceed to Kabul if he already had reached 
2
Balkh. The Amir provided housing for the Russian Envoy
when he reached Kabul in September but declined to receive
him. Shere Ali delivered over to the British Vekeel the 
declaration from General Kaufmann brought by the Muslem
1
Pollock to Aitcheson, 30 August 1875 in Great 
Britain, Foreign Office, Conf ident ia1 Prints 539, 3870, 
"Correspondence Respecting Russian Proceedings m  Central 
Asia," 92.
2
Pollock to Aitcheson, 1 September 1875 in Great 
Britain, Parliament, Sessional Papers, L X X X , Central Asia 
No. 1 (1878), "Correspondence Respecting Central Asia," 
517; Pollock to Aitcheson, 6 September 1875, 517.
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Agent. It contained Kaufmann's acknowledgement of two 
letters from the Amir, the congratulations on the nomina­
tion of Abdullah Jan and a statement of pleasure on the
friendly relations between Afghanistan and Great Brit- 
3
ain. British officials perceived a new tone in Kauf­
mann's message and concluded, "God knows what state 
secrets are concealed in it!"^
The A m i r ’s border guards turned back from the Amu 
Darya a second Moslem Agent from Tashkend in February
1876.^ A third Russian messenger successfully reached
6Kabul some time in August. He presented Shere Ali with 
a second proclamation from Kaufmann which emphasized the 
friendship between Russia and Afghanistan^ and explained
O
Russian motives for the annexation of Khokand. The Amir 
returned a vague but cordial response which alluded to
3
Ibid., Pollock to Aitcheson, 13 September 1875,
517. ”
^Ibid., Pollock to Aitcheson, 15 September 1875,
518.
^Ibid., Pollock to Thornton, 25 February 1876,
526.
^Ibid., Pollock to Thornton, 6 June 1876, 529-30; 
Thomson to Derby, 9 August 1876 in Confidential Prints 
539, 3870, 140; Meshed Agent, 7 June 18 767" 140-4T"]
^Cabul Diary, 22-24 August 1876 rn SP, LXXX Cen­
tral Asia No. 1 (1878), 539.
g
Ibid., Governor General in Council to Salisbury,
18 September 1876, 537.
problems with the British caused by Kaufmann's correspon-
. 9d e n c e .
The Viceroy entreated the Home government to ten­
der a formal complaint about the increased activity of 
General Kaufmann. To Salisbury he confided he formerly 
had not felt it necessary to complain of the correspon­
dence between the Governor of Tashkend and the Amir of
Kabul. The reception of Russian emissaries at Kabul, how-
10ever, made intervention imperative. Lytton contended 
Shere Ali discussed matters of political significance in 
his communications with Kaufmann and held clandestine 
meetings with the Governor's emissaries. These activities 
defied both the Anglo-Afghan agreement and the guarantees 
of Prince Gortchakov given in 1869. The Viceroy feared
Russia would supplant Britain at Kabul if the situation
11 12 went unchallenged. Salisbury agreed. Lord Loftus,
British Ambassador to St. Petersburg, accordingly reminded
the Russian government of its pledge to regard Afghanistan
as "completely outside the sphere within which Russia may
9
Ibid., MacNabb to Thornton, 19 September 1876,
541-42.
^ I b i d . ,  Viceroy to Salisbury, 16 September 1876,
533-34.
11 Ibid., Governor General in Council to Salisbury, 
18 September 1876, 537.
12 Ibid., L. Mallet to Tenterden, 22 September
1876, 533.
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be called upon to exercise her influence.”
Count Schouvalov, Russian Representative in Lon­
don, disclaimed all knowledge of Kaufmann's interference
jL A1in Afghan affairs. When questioned, Kaufmann had told
Prince de Giers, head of Russia's Asiatic Department, his
correspondence to Shere Ali contained only expressions
of friendship. He also denied he had sent agents to Kabul
and insisted the Amir of Bokhara or Khan of Balkh trans-
15mitted all his letters to the Amir for him. Gortchakov
16relayed the denial to Loftus on November 15. De Giers 
admitted two days later, however, that an emissary from 
Kaufmann had delivered a message directly to the Amir. 
Loftus demanded that Kaufmann discontinue his exclusive 
communications with Shere Ali. De Giers claimed the Gov­
ernor of Tashkend feared an expedition against the Merv 
17Turcomans allegedly contemplated by Shere Ali in viola­
tion of Britain's agreement to restrain him from any
■^Ibid., Derby to Loftus, 2 October 1876, 534; 
Loftus to de G i e r s , 30 September 1876 in Confidential 
Prints 539 , 3870, 534.
^ D e r b y  to Loftus, 24 October 1876 in SP, LXXX , 
Central Asia No. 1 (1878), 540.
15 Ibid., Kaufmann to de Giers, 9 November 1876,
549-50.
^^Ibid., Loftus to Derby, 15 November 1876, 543.
1 7 Ibid., Loftus to Derby, 16 November 1876,
543-44.
18interference north of the Amu Darya. No conclusive 
evidence exists to substantiate the accusation but even 
the possibility provided the Russian government with an 
explanation for Kaufmann’s behavior. Salisbury chose not 
to accept the excuse because he firmly believed Kaufmann 
had overslepped the bounds of the Anglo-Kussian agree­
ment. He insisted the correspondence with Shere Ali 
19s t o p .
The dispute over the Kaufmann correspondence
occured shortly before the Peshawar Conference. From the
close of the Conference and removal of the British Vakeel
from Kabul, no official intercourse transpired between
20the Viceroy and the Amir, although frequent rumors of
21a jehad against the British reached India. The India 
government gave permission to a Turkish Mission to travel 
to Kabul in September to petition Shere Ali for aid in 
their war against Russia. The Turks requested he do no 
more than continue his alliance with Britain. The Amir 
evaded the question, complaining instead of British intru­
sions in his affairs. He cited British interference in 
Quetta and other parts of the frontier as evidence.
1 8
Ibid., Loftus to Derby, 6 December 1876, 547.
19
Ibid., Loftus to Derby, 16 November 1876,
543-44.
20Northbrook, Afghan Question, 43.
21Murza Abbass Khan to Taylour Thomson, 8 July 
1877 in Confidential Prints 539 , 3870, 256-57.
Russia, he added, had not trespassed in his territory.
Moreover, the British Government greviously insulted him
with their incessant demands to send European agents afte
he had told them he could not protect them. He pres-
ciently concluded, "God forbid, if any of their agents
were assassinated, they would at once come down upon me
22and charge me with being the instigator."
The outbreak of the Russo-Turkish war in April
1877 exacerbated the tenuous situation in Central Asia.
While chaotic negotiations went on in Europe, equally con
fused discussions took place in the India government. Th
emergence of Shere Ali's nephew Abdur Rahman added to
Britain's existing problems. The Governor of Samarcand's
son, who had accompanied the Russian Envoy, informed the
Amir of R u s s i a 's refusal to help Abdur Rahman take Afghan
istan from him. In the event of a war with Great Britain
however, Abdur Rahman had promised to defeat the Amir and
allow the Russians passage to India. The Russian Agent
cautioned Shere Ali of the importance of an immediate
alliance between Russia and Afghanistan to protect him
23from his nephew's threats. Shere Ali knew quite well 
Abdur Rahman could not defeat him without Russian sup­
port. The, warning nicely served the Russian cause.
22 Philips, Evolution of India and Pakistan,
451-52.
23 Confidential Newsletters From Government Agent 
at Peshawar, 13 May 1878 in SP, L X X X , Central Asia No.
1 (1878), 590-91.
British officials at Peshawar sent the first
reports of a European Russian agent on his way to Kabul
24in early June 1878. The impending arrival of a Euro­
pean agent from Russia profoundly disturbed the Amir. He 
notified Kaufmann, via the Governor of Samarcand, he could
not receive a European agent for the same reason he had
25refused the British •- he could not protect him. He then 
assembled his Chiefs to discuss the matter of the Russian 
agent and the implied threat of Abdur Rahman. Unofficial 
information acquired by Major Cavagnari at Peshawar indi­
cated a reevaluation by the Afghan Government of their 
relations with the British. The Amir told his advisors 
he considered Russia's recent behavior extremely unwise. 
Several members of his Council, greatly alarmed by Rus­
sia's conduct, recommended they reassert their willingness
2 6to cooperate with Britain.
In mid-June a reliable Afghan source informed the 
Indian government of a series of proposals presented to 
the Amir by the Russian Envoy still at Kabul. The Rus­
sians requested the reception of Russian officials with
24 Ibid., Unofficial Communication from Peshawar, 
r> June 1878""^  591.
25 Ibid., Extract From Peshawar Diary by Cavagnari, 
5 June 1878"^ 592; Unofficial Communication From Peshawar,
5 June 1878 in Confidentia1 Prints 5 3 9 , 3870, 96-97.
2 6Extract of Peshawar Diary by Cavagnari, 16 June 
1878 in SP, L X X X , Central Asia No. 1 (1878), 593; Extract 
From Uonfidential Newsletter From Jelalabad, 16 June 1878, 
614.
the status of consuls at several locations in Afghanistan; 
consent to. position troops on Afghanistan's borders; 
authorization to build a road from Samarcand to Kabul, 
Herat and Kandahar; passage to India; construction of a 
telegraph line between troop locations; and sale of provi­
sions by the Afghans at a fair price. In compensation, 
the Russian government offered to recognize the Amir's 
family as his rightful heirs "in perpetuity," remain out­
side of his internal affairs, grant material support for
both the internal and external harmony of Afghanistan and
27receive Afghan envoys in Russia. The Russian government 
proposed precisely what Shere Ali most wanted -■ recogni­
tion of Abdulla Jan and aid against all enemies. De Giers 
denied that any such conspiracy had occurred although he 
did admit that Russian military authorities may have pre­
pared a plan for protecting their southern borders in view
2 8of the possibility of war with Britain.
The Viceroy telegraphed Secretary of State Cran-
brook on 30 July that an Indian Medical Officer loaned
to Shere Ali had overheard the Amir tell of the arrival
of General Kaufmann and a military escort at the Amu 
29Darya. The Amir's officials had stopped the Mission 
2 7Extract From Peshawar Newsletter, 18 June 1878 
in Confidential Prints 3 3 9 , 3870, 132.
2 8
Loftus to Salisbury in SP, L X X X , Central Asia
1 (1878), 586.
29 Salisbury had been appointed Foreign Secretary.
but allowed them to proceed after receiving orders from 
Shere Ali. Lytton did not believe the Envoy to be Kauf­
mann and speculated he must be a high-ranking native offi­
cer. He requested permission for the Indian government
to handle the matter. He intended to demand that the Amir
30accept a British mission if Cranbrook agreed. Cranbrook
gave his permission but cautioned Lytton to make certain
of the presence of a Russian mission at Kabul before
insisting the Amir receive a British one. He also
31requested the Viceroy to keep him informed. Lytton 
telegraphed three days later that a Russian Mission defi­
nitely had arrived at Kabul. He felt he could settle the 
matter quickly and with only slight disturbance if left 
alone. He even speculated that a British Mission would 
release Shere Ali from pressure. With Cranbrook1s author­
ization he would instruct his agent to conclude a new
agreement with the Amir based on Salisbury's original 
32m s  true t ions .
Viceroy to Cranbrook, 30 July 1878 in SP, L X X X , 
Central Asia No. 1 (1878), 597; Lytton to CranTrrook, 30 
July 1878, i_n Indian Office Library, Ly t ton Collection, 
"Correspondence Respecting the Relations Between the Brit­
ish Government and that of Afghanistan Since the Accession 
of the Ameer Shere Ali Khan," C.2190, Mss Eur E 218/11,
227 .
^ C r a n b r o o k  to Lytton,. 1 August 1878 in SP, LVI, 
Afghanistan (1878), "Correspondence Respecting the Rela­
tionship Between the British Government and That of 
Afghanistan Since the Accession of the Ameer Shere Ali 
Khan," 602.
I bid., Lytton to Cranbrook, 2 August 1878, 598.
Lytton decided that Britain must take prompt mea­
sures to keep Afghanistan from Russia. He evaluated the 
frontier situation in a Minute in which he labeled the 
present conditions "dangerously defective." Russia's 
equally inadequate southern frontier made security precau­
tions absolutely necessary. The status of Afghanistan 
had reached a crucial point. Lytton claimed non-interven­
tionists based their policies on the mistaken notion Rus­
sia would use force to enter Afghanistan and thus push 
the Amir to the British for help. The Viceroy believed 
Russia would use more insidious methods to control Afghan­
istan. Consequently, Britain either must reassert their 
primacy at Kabul or, failing that, make another agreement 
with Russia to guarantee their respective frontiers. He 
personally favored the former option because it required 
less time and fewer entanglements. The Home government 
had given him permission to attempt a mission to Kabul. 
Negotiations with another European Power would be out of 
his jurisdiction and subject to Parliamentary debate 
situation Lytton found very unappealing. He advised Cran­
brook he did not anticipate serious opposition from Shere 
Ali and drew up instructions for his envoy to offer the 
Amir a new arrangement based on certain conditions. The 
Amir must bar all Russian officials from Afghanistan and 
have no communication with them without British permis­
sion. He must receive British missions when necessary 
and allow the stationing of British officials at Herat
and Balkh, or a permanent agent at Kabul. In return, the 
British would grant him a fixed yearly allowance, acknowl­
edge his chosen successor and "guarantee against annexa­
tion." The Viceroy resolved he would make war on Afghan-
33
istan only as a last resort. The idea of war, however, 
had become a distinct possibility.
Lytton received varied reports on the Russia Mis­
sion during the first week of August. Cavagnari reported 
from Peshawar that the Russian Envoy had threatened to
bring Abdur Rahman to Kabul if the Amir refused the Rus-
34sian proposals. Now that conclusive evidence existed
about the Russian mission at Kabul, Salisbury gave his
permission to send the British. He instructed Lytton to
inform him before taking any action in the event Shere
35Ali refused the Mission.
The Russian group appeared to have left Tashkend
at the same time negotiations opened between Turkey and
3 6Russia at Berlin. Cranbrook called Salisbury's
^ I b i d . ,  Minute by Lytton, 150-67.
34 Newsletter From Government Agent at Peshawar,
4 August 1878 Ln SP, LXXVII, Central Asia No. 2 (1878), 
"Further Correspondence Respecting Central Asia," C. 2188 
66 .
3 5
L. Mallet to Tenterden, 8 August 1878 in SP,
L X X X , Central Asia No. 1 (1878), 596-97; Secretary of 
State to Viceroy, 3 August 1878 in SP, L V I , Afghanistan 
(1878), 603.
3 6Khan, A Chapter in the Great G a m e , 214; Roberts, 
Forty-one Years Tn India, XT, 110.
attention to several articles in Russian newspapers he 
believed represented accurate accounts of Russian 
affairs. They also reflected the uneasy situation between 
Russia and Britain over Turkey. An article in the Golos 
of 1 August announced that three columns of troops, each 
with a separate mission had left Russia. One column pro­
posed to subdue the tribes along the upper Amu Darya, the 
second to take Merv and its surrounding area, and the 
third to subjugate the tribesmen between the Amu Darya 
and the Hindu Kush; well into Afghan territory. This last
group would move on into India with Shere A l i 's coopera- 
37tion. A second article denied that Shere Ali had
refused entry to a Russian Mission led by General
Stolietov. It claimed the delay at the Amy Darya occured
because an escort from the Amir had not arrived on
time. The story in Novoe Vremia also described the
unusually cordial reception accorded Stolietov at
Kabul a 115 gun salute rather than the 51 guns given
3 8for an India Viceroy. Cranbrook could not have been 
positive about the authenticity of Russian newspaper 
accounts. They did lend support, however, to the Govern­
ment's decision to give Lytton his way.
The threat of an Anglo-Russian war abated with
^ E x t r a c t  From the "Golos," 1 August 1878 in SP, 
L X X X , Central. Asia No. 1 ( 1878), 602.
3 8Translation of Extract of "Novoe Vremia," in 
SP, LXX V I I , Central Asia No. 2 (1878), 77-78.
the signing of the Treaty of Berlin on 13 July. Plunkett, 
the British charge d ’affaires at St. Petersburg, ques­
tioned Prince de Giers again in mid-August about reported 
Russian troop movements. De Giers cautiously replied that 
military officials did not include him in their tactical 
decisions. He assured Plunkett the Russian government
had ordered all troops to return. ’’Everything,” he said,
39’’has been stopped.” For the British, everything had 
not stopped and they remained dismally ignorant of the 
purpose and success of Stolietov at .Kabul. His presence 
at Kabul seemed more ominous since the prospect of war 
had diminished.
Lytton dispatched the Nawab Gholam Hussein Khan 
with a letter to Shere Ali on 14 August. The letter 
explained that the Viceroy wished to send Sir Neville 
Chamberlain, Commander of the Madras Army, to discuss a 
new agreement toward reestablishing close relations.
Lytton asked the Amir to instruct his provincial chiefs 
to receive the Mission and grant passage to Kabul in the 
manner customary for emissaries of an amiable n a t i o n . ^
The death of Abdulla Jan on 17 August interrupted the 
Viceroy's plans. Cavagnari advised that Chamberlain 
remain at Peshawar until Lytton received instructions from
39
Plunkett to Salisbury, 14 August 1878 in SP,
L X X X , Central Asia No. 1 (1878), 601.
^ V i c e r o y  to Shere Ali Khan, 14 August 1878 Ln 
SP, L V I , Afghanistan (1878), 606.
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A 1Kabul. He wrote again the next day explaining Afghan
mourning customs. The Amir and his Court would conduct
no business for approximately three days. At the end of
this intense bereavement, the A m i r ’s Court would observe
a period of more moderate mourning lasting forty days in
which traditionally they handled business as usual.
Cavagnari suggested, however, Shere Ali might use the
death of his son to defer the attentions of both Russia
and Britain. He advised Lytton to delay any action until
42the Nawab could wait upon the Amir. The Viceroy fol-
43lowed the advice and kept Chamberlain at Peshawar.
Cavagnari learned of the departure of the Russian
Envoy from Kabul at the end of August. News from Kabul
indicated the Amir appeared willing to accept a British 
44Mission. The Viceroy used the pause caused by Abdulla 
Jan's death to prepare a new Minute on frontier policy.
He warned against the dangers of Russian entrenchment at 
Kabul. From Kabul, he argued, Russia easily might extend 
her influence over India's frontier tribes thus greatly 
increasing her reputation - "a factor of almost magic
41 Ibid., Caivagnari to Viceroy, 21 August 1878,
607.
42 Cavagnari to Viceroy, 22 August 1878 in Confi- 
dential Prints 5 3 9 , 3870, 164.
/
Viceroy to Cranbrook, 25 August 1878 i_n SP, L V I , 
Afghanistan (1878), 607.
44 Ibid., Cavagnari to Viceroy, 31 August 1878,
655. ----
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45power in Eastern warfare.” Lytton proposed the Govern­
ment rectify its Northwest Frontier by securing a line 
stretching along the mountains of the Hindu Kush from the
Pamirs to Herat, back across to the Helmand, south along
46the river to Kandahar and out to the Arabian Sea (fig.
Clearly Lytton entertained few doubts about the
best way to proceed. He instructed Chamberlain to leave
for Kabul about 16 September; the Nawab by then having
told the Amir of the benevolent purpose of the Mission
but also having warned Shere Ali that ”a refusal of free
passage and safe conduct will be considered [an] act of
open h o s t i l i t y . " ^  He authorized Chamberlain to demand
the departure of all Russian Agents and assure the Amir
48of defense against any Russian threat.
Cranbrook asked Lytton on 13 September to suspend
the Mission until St. Petersburg responded to a protest
4 9
sent by the British Government. In the interval the 
Afghan affair assumed great significance in England due
45 Lytton's Minute on Frontier Policy, 4 September 
1878 in Philips, The Evolution of India and Pakistan, 452.
47 Telegram From Viceroy, 8 Septmeber 1878 in SP 
L V I , Afghanistan (1878), 608.
48 Viceroy to Cranbrook, 8 September 1878 in Confi- 
dential Prints 5 3 9 , 3870, 136-37.
49
Ibid., Cranbrook to Viceroy, 13 September 1878, 
139. “
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to The T i m e s 1 Calcutta correspondent. Three articles in
one week claimed the British Government, specifically the
Foreign and India Offices, had constructed a definite
policy to eliminate all future problems on the Northwest
Frontier. The Correspondent gave particular credit to
the Viceroy who was, he believed,
. . . gifted with broad statesmanlike views, the
result partly of the application of great natural 
intellectual capacity to the close cultivation 
of politica^gscience and the highest order of 
statecraft.
The second news story contended that the British
must do whatever necessary to stop Russian influence at
51Kabul even if it meant war. In the third feature, the 
Calcutta Correspondent approved the proposed British Mis­
sion as "a momentous departure” from the old policies and
a necessary prologue to a peaceful settlement of frontier 
52problems. The Home government at this point also viewed
Lytton's insistence on a mission as part of a well-planned
policy to thwart Russian designs on Afghanistan. Disraeli
confided to Cranbrook that the Viceroy's management of
the problem with the Amir had raised his already high
53estimation of him. He therefore authorized the Secre­
tary to use his own judgement in advising Lytton. He
^ The Times (London), September 9, 1878.
 ^I b i d . , September 10, 1878.
^ Ibid., September 16, 1878.
“^ Buckle, Disraeli, 381.
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personally did not feel the Mission need wait any longer 
to depart for K a bul.^
Shere Ali received the Nawab on 12 September. The 
Amir told him he indeed had given the Russian Mission per­
mission to come to Kabul but he did not intend to grant 
the same privilege to the British. He would consider 
the British Mission when he had mourned his son's 
death. The Amir ordered the Nawab to read him a letter 
in which Chamberlain advised the Agent to "act firmly" 
if the Amir attempted to hinder the arrival of their Mis­
sion. Shere Ali threatened to break off all relations
5 6with the British if they forced the Mission on him. He
offered instead to send a representative to Peshawar to
consult with Chamberlain.^^ Chamberlain already had
requested a safe conduct from Faiz Mohammed, Commander
of the Fort at Ali Masjid. He had cautioned the Commander
that failure to grant passage would not stop his Mis- 
58sion. Lytton authorized him to leave Peshawar without 
waiting for the Amir's emissary and to make separate
■^Telegram to Viceroy, 17 September 1878 in SP. 
L V I , Afghanistan (1878), 610.
5 6 Ibid., Viceroy to Secretary of State, 1 Decem­
ber 1878, FET7
"^Ibid., Chamberlain to Viceroy, 17 September 
1878, 615.
58 Ibid., Chamberlain to Faiz Mohammed, 15 Septem­
ber 1878, 5T57
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agreements with the Khyberi tribes if Faiz Mohammed
59refused the Mission.
Cavagnari, accompanied by a small escort, left
Peshawar for Ali Masjid on 21 September. When they
arrived they met with an absolute refusal from Faiz Moham-
60med to proceed further. Chamberlain telegraphed the 
Viceroy at once for instructions. Lytton told him to 
recall Cavagnari, inform Faiz Mohammed the British govern­
ment considered his refusal as that of the Amir and make
private arrangements for passage to Kabul with the
. ., 61tribes.
The British government found itself faced with
an onerous choice ■■ complete withdrawal from Afghan
affairs or a provocative measure which might result ir
war. Disraeli, hoping to avoid Cabinet involvement,
instructed Cranbrook to decide on a suitable course of
action with the Viceroy. The Prime Minister would support
6 2their decision. Lytton assured Cranbrook that as long 
as the Russians did not intervene, he could solve the pro­
blem "without extensive military operations or heavy
59 Ibid., Viceroy to Chamberlain, 17 September
1878, 615.
^ Ibid ., Telegram from Commissioner of Peshawar,
21 September T878, 619.
61 Ibid., Viceroy to Chamberlain, 22 September
1878, 610.
^ B u c k l e ,  Disraeli, 381-82.
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A Q
expenditure.” He requested the Government suggest to
the Russians that their intrusion might provoke similar
interference by the British in Russian possessions
Faiz Moh a m m e d ’s conduct had made further overtures
useless in Lytton's judgement. Assistance from the inde-
f\ s
pendent tribes seemed the only means to reach Kabul.
These tribes, although autonomous, nominally recognized
Shere Ali as their ruler. The attempt to obtain their
assistance affirmed the Amir's conviction that the British
threatened his independence. Cavagnari predicted that
treating with the tribes independently would frustrate
6 6any possible negotiations with the Amir but this time 
the Viceroy ignored the Commissioner’s advice.
Both Lytton's own Party and the Opposition ulti­
mately criticized his insistence on the British Mis­
sion. The Viceroy angered Disraeli initially by sending 
the Mission, against orders, before the Government 
received R u s s i a ’s response to their complaint. The Prime 
Minister's irritation increased when he learned the Mis­
sion had disobeyed his instructions to go via Kandahar 
and the Bolan pass and instead chose the Khyber with its
6 3Viceroy to Cranbrook, 26 September 1878 in Con- 
fidential Prints 5 3 9 , 3870, 168.
64Ibid.
6 5Government of India to Cranbrook, 26 September 
1878 in LC, Mss Eur E 218/11.
^ H a n n a , The Second Afghan War, I, 216.
106
much higher potential for resistance (fig. 2}. The
"man-on-the-spot” had taken his own initiative and
"received a snub, which it may cost us much to wipe 
6 7away.” Lytton*s impulsiveness forced Disraeli to con­
vene the Cabinet in an effort to silence the many rumors 
which proliferated in England. The Viceroy's methods, 
he stated, would have been suitable had Russia been the 
aggressor. As it stood, Lytton faced this stalemate with
the Amir of Afghanistan because he had disregarded
a 68orders .
Lytton received a letter from the Amir during the
second week in October protesting the intimidating quality
69of the Viceroy's messages delivered by the Nawab.
Lytton forwarded the Amir's letter to the Home govern­
ment. He pointed' out, in his accompanying note, that the 
Amir neither had apologized for the insult at Ali Masjid 
nor made any allusions to improving his relations with 
the British. Moreover, viewed within the context of East­
ern manners, Shere Ali's tone was deliberately imper­
tinent. The Viceroy advised they lose no more time by 
demanding an apology. He and his Council had decided the 
British Government should issue a formal statement
6 7Disraeli to Cranbrook, 26 September 1878 in 
Buckle, Pi srae 11 , 382.
^ I b i d . , Disraeli to Cranbrook, 3 October 1878,
383.
69 Viceroy to Government, 19 October 1878 in SP 
L V I , Afghanistan (1878), 626-27.
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expressing friendship for the people of Afghanistan and
placing blame for the dispute solely on the Amir. The
Indian army should move into the Kurram Valley and eject
70the Amir's guard from the Khyber pass. Lytton's deci­
sions had become increasingly provocative. He had con­
cluded that a "war with Afghanistan [would be] a deplor-
71able necessity." In England, Sir Henry Rawlinson corro­
borated rumors that the Viceroy had isolated himself from
his opponents in India and had "taken to eat and drink
72more than is good for him."
Salisbury rejected Lytton's proposals, directed 
him to appeal to Shere Ali both for an apology and a safe 
conduct for the British Mission. He did endorse a troop 
movement on the frontier as a show of strength. The Brit­
ish government would regard the Amir as an antagonist and
take the necessary action unless it received the apology
73and acceptance of the Mission.
The dispute with the Amir invoked severe criti­
cism from Cabinet and Parliament members who felt that 
Russian reaction would frustrate negotiations on the
^ I b i d . ,  Telegram From Viceroy, 19 October 1878, 
"Cabul Correspondence," 627.
^ " M i s s i o n  to Cabul," in L C , Mss Eur E 218/7,
20-31 .
72 Granville to Gladstone, 20 October 1878 ijri Ramm, 
Political Correspondence, 83.
7 3
Secretary of State to Viceroy, 25 October 1878 
in SP, L V I , Afghanistan (1878), 628; 30 October 1878,
FZ8-29 .
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74implementation of the Berlin Treaty. Disraeli argued
that no other course lay open. They had dealt with the
Amir as one would a spoiled child. He either had ignored
their communications completely or replied discour- 
75teously. Cranbrook added his support to Lytton ' s poli-
7 6cies and the Cabinet yielded. The Afghan Committee, 
formed by Lord Lawrence, attempted to dissuade the Prime 
Minister from war, requested the publication of all rele­
vant papers and a debate in Parliament on the proposed
ultimatum to Shere Ali. Disraeli refused all three
i 77 appeals.
The Viceroy's methods, met by equal resistance 
from his 'Victim", had deepened the stalemate between 
Britain and Afghanistan. The presence of Abdur Rahman 
in Russia and the death of Abdullah Jan were chance occur­
rences which caused additional complications. More criti­
cal, however, was the structure of government which 
prompted officials to use measures specifically designed 
to avoid involvement of the British public of Parliament. 
This attitude permitted the "man-on-the-spot to achieve 
a situation which only armed conflict could solve.
74 Brigadier General Sir Percy Sykes, A History 
of Afghanistan (London: Macmillan and Company7 L t d ., L 9 4 0 ) 
TO 8 .
^BeaconsEi eld Speech in Great Britain, Parlia­
ment, Hans a r d 's Par1iamentary Debates, GCXLIII, 516.
^ S y k e s ,  History of Afghanistan, 108.
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Hanna, The Second Afghan W a r , I, 251.
CHAPTER VI
WAR - THE FIRST PHASE 
November 1878
Faiz Mohammed received the British ultimatum to
the Amir on 3 November.^ In the following days, Lytton,
his Secretary A.C. Lyall and his military advisors made
preparations for war and continued their efforts to
2divorce the frontier tribes from Shere Ali. The approach 
of winter which would close the mountain passes into 
Afghanistan made them hope for a prompt decision from Lon­
don. They greatly feared Shere Ali would "send an apology
3
or the Home Government suddenly interfere."
Though angered at L y t t o n rs disregard of his 
instructions, Disraeli could do very little about the 
deadlock with Afghanistan the Viceroy had created. His 
only alternative to allowing Lytton to use his own means 
to solve the predicament was to recall him and admit he 
had made a grave error in appointing him as Viceroy.
1
Viceroy to Government, 4 November 1878 Ln Great 
Britain, Parliament, Sessional Papers, L V I , Afghanistan 
(1878), "Further Papers Relative to the Affairs of Afghan­
istan," 634.
2
Ibid. -, Memorandum From A. C. Lyall to Government 
if India, 623.
^Hanna, The Second Afghan War, I, 243.
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Moreover, a successful invasion of Afghanistan would allow 
rectification of the Northwest Frontier; a prospect 
attractive to the Prime Minister. In a speech at the Lord 
Mayor's dinner in early November, Disraeli used the term 
"scientific frontier" for the first time. The phrase 
derived from the French description of their artificial 
boundary with the Lowlands. They had created a "scien­
tific" boundary where no physical divide such as mountains
4
or rivers existed to separate the two countries. Dis­
raeli regarded the present Northwest boundary of the 
Indian Empire as "haphazard" at best; requiring a large 
and expensive force to protect it. He believed the Brit­
ish should design a "scientific" frontier to remove future 
anxiety and enable them to enjoy friendly relations with 
their neighbors.^
The Amir had not responded by 20 November as the 
ultimatum demanded thus the British declared a state of 
war between Britain and Afghanistan at sunset of that 
day. British troops invaded the Amir's territory the 
next day, striking first at the Fort of Ali Masjid where 
the Mission had been turned back seven weeks earlier. The
4
Duff, The Afghan Policy of the Beaconsfield Gov­
ernment , 30.
^Buckle, Disraeli, 390-91.
^Sydney H. Shadbolt, The Afghan Campaign of 
1878-1880, Compiled From Official and PrTvate Sources 
TLondon : Sampson Low~^ Mar s ton , Sear le and Riving ton , 1882)
Amir's reply, which arrived a few days later, contained 
neither the apology nor the safe conduct required. The 
Amir announced the British had confirmed his earlier 
assumption that they would hold him accountable for the 
safety of a mission. He agreed, however, to receive a
g
small delegation of twenty or thirty persons.
The debate in Parliament on the war began on 9 
December 1878. Stanhope, Undersecretary of State, sup­
ported the Viceroy with the contention that the Amir's 
reply to the Ultimatum had not arrived in India until 30 
November ten days after the British deadline. The 
Amir's messenger, in fact, had reached Basawal (on the 
Kabul River about two thirds of the way from Jalalabad 
to D a kka) on 22 November. He supposedly had returned the 
Amir's letter to Kabul on hearing of the defeat of the 
Amir's troops at Ali Masjid. Shere Ali then wrote the
9
reply which offered to receive a small mission.
Salisbury answered Northbrook's call for a censure 
of Government by claiming the shift to a more aggressive 
policy had resulted from the lack of information left from 
Northbrook's Viceroyalty. He agreed that Russia probably
^Malleson, Hi s tory of Afghani s tan, 452.
g
Amir of Kabul to Viceroy, 19 November 1878 ija 
SP, L V I , Afghanistan No. 1 (1880), "Further Correspon­
dence," C, 2401, 699-700.
9
December 1878 ijn Great Britain, Parliament, 
Hansard's Par1iamentary Debates (Commons), CCXLIII 308.
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would not invade India but the diplomatic assaults on
Britain Russia could execute from Kabul necessitated
uncompromising action. The Secretary also denied the
India government had assured the Amir's failure to comply
with British conditions by withdrawing the Vakeel from
his Court thereby suspending any personal negotiations
10which might have eased tensions.
A dispute over the lack of communication between 
India and London arose during the debate in the House of 
Commons. Mr. Morgan Lloyd queried Stanhope about the 
amount of official information received from India between 
28 February 1876 and 10 May 1877; from Salisbury's ori­
ginal instructions to Lytton to the termination of the 
Peshawar Conference. Stanhope replied that they had 
received no official communications other than the pub­
lished general statements of the Government of India and 
a few insignificant entries from the Kabul Diaries. 
Consequently, he could supply neither the dates of the
dissents filed by three members of the Viceroy's Council
1 1nor the removal of the Native Agent from Kabul. The 
Undersecretary answered that the Viceroy had used his own 
discretion as the authority for his October 1876 statement 
that Shere Ali must reach an agreement with the British
1 0 T M d .  3 Salisbury Debate on Vote for Expenses,
10 December T878, 501-07.
^Ibid. , 10 December 1878, 525-28.
12^ risk an Anglo-Russian alliance at his expense.
It appeared to Parliament that Lord Lytton had 
refrained intentionally from apprising the Home government 
of events in Afghanistan. His failures to do so violated 
the accepted procedures of his office. Viceroys and 
colonial governors frequently kept London in ignorance 
about such delicate issues, however, rarely for such a 
long period especially in view of the dissent in his own 
Council. Lytton, with the support of Salisbury and Cran­
brook, had decided he must take strong steps to preserve 
the safety of Indian Empire. Therefore he could not risk 
uninformed or factional interference by Parliament or 
Cabinet members.
While the British debated, the Amir sought support
from Russia. He had informed the Emperor of the proba-
13bility of war with Britain in early November. Report­
edly, the Russian Government had advised him to be 
patient. The Amir told his advisors he feared England
and Russia intended to divide Afghanistan between 
1 Athem. A representative of the Russian government
^ Ibid., 13 December 1878, 737-38.
■^Shere Ali to Emperor, 9 October 1878 Ln SP, 
XCVIII, Central Asia No. 1 (1881), "Correspondence Res­
pecting Affairs in Central Asia," C. 2798, 353-54; Shere 
Ali to Kaufmann, October 1878, 353.
1 AExtract From Newsletter, Dera Ismail Khan, 10 
November 1878 in SP, LXXVIII, Central Asia No. 1 (1880), 
"Further Correspondence Respecting Affairs in Central 
Asia, 1879," 88-89.
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confided to Sir Henry Elliot at Budapest on 16 November
1878 that his Government had overlooked the A m i r ’s enmity
toward the British while their own relations with Britain
had been strained. The Russians attempted to reduce Shere
A l i ’s hostility after the Peace of Berlin but had failed
15because the Amir believed he could defeat the British.
A confused Shere Ali, one day wrathful toward
16Britain, the next toward Russia, left Kabul on 13 Decem­
ber. He freed his elder son Yakub from prison to take 
his place and set off to ask the Russian Emperor to call
a conference of European nations to arbitrate his com-
17plaint against England.
While the Amir pursued counsel from the Emperor, 
Count Schouvalov notified Salisbury his Government had 
recalled their delegation from Kabul. Salisbury, unaware 
the Mission remained at Kabul, reacted to this information 
with considerable surprise. The Russian Ambassador 
assured him he had advised prompt withdrawal but the War 
Minister and Prince de Giers had contradicted him hoping 
the Mission's presence in Kabul would permit leverage with
1 5
Elliot to Salisbury, 16 November 1878 i_n Con- 
fidential Prints 5 3 9 , 3871, "Further Correspondence 
Respecting Russian Proceedings in Central Asia," 347.
16 Newsletter From Government Agent at Dera Ismail 
Khan, 22 November 1878 in SP, LXXVIII, Central Asia No.
1 (1880), 89.
17 Ali, The Mohammedzai Period, 92
115
18England in negotiations over Turkey. A week later the
Count inquired if the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1873
remained in effect. The Emperor hoped to maintain the
former understanding with respect to Central Asia and
promised to recall those of the Mission left at 
19Kabul. Salisbury agreed the removal of the Mission
20would restore accord between Russia and Britain.
Cavagnari verified on 20 December the Amir's
departure for Russia along with the last members of the
Russian delegation. He reported also that many of the
21Amir's troops had abandoned him. Salisbury learned that
the Emperor has issued an order to bar Shere Ali admission 
22to Russia and that Kaufmann had sent the Amir a message
23advising him to make peace with Britain. Kaufmann again 
communicated with Shere Ali four days later requesting
18 Salisbury to Loftus, 11 December 1878 bn Confi­
dential Prints 539 , 3871, 370.
19
Schouvaloff to Salisbury, 19 December 1878 bn 
SP, LXXVII, Central Asia No. 1 (1879), "Further Correspon­
dence Respecting Central Asia," C. 2209, 104.
20 Ibid., Salisbury to Schouvaloff, 19 December 
1878, 104-U37-
^ C a v a g n a r i  to Viceroy, 20 December 1878 bn SP,
LVI, Afghanistan No. 1 (1879), C. 2401, 701.
22 Salisbury to Loftus, 6  January 1879 in Confiden- 
tial Prints 539, 4100, "Further Correspondence Respecting 
ATTIiFi- in Central Asia," 16.
^ K a u f m a n n  to Shere Ali, 7 January 1879 bn SP 
XCVII, Central Asia No. 1 (1881), C. 2798, 359.
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24him to come to Tashkend. The invitation to enter Rus­
sian territory restored Shere A l i 1s hopes. He entreated 
his officials at Herat to prepare a strong defense against
the British in expectation of relief from Russia in the 
25spring.
British troops scored several quick victories in
Afghanistan. General Sam Browne entered Jalalabad on 20
December, General Donald Stewart’s troops seized Kandahar
with little opposition on 9 January 1879. General
Rob e r t ’s force reached Shutargardan, about thirty miles
southeast of Kabul, a few days before Christmas (fig.
2 61). Yakub Khan sent an urgent plea for advice to Cavag­
nari when apprised of British military successes. He
promised to urge his father to abandon his struggle
27against the British. Before Yakub could negotiate,
Shere Ali died near Balkh on 21 February from a long
ry i
Ibid., Kaufmann to Shere Ali, 11 January 1879,
359.
25 Translation of a Firman by Amir Shere Ali Khan,
22 December 1878 Ln SP, LVII, Afghanistan No. 1 (1879),
C. 2401, 702; Thomson to Salisbury, LXXVII, Central Asia 
No. 1, 109.
o A
William Hunt and Reginald L. Poole, The Politi­
cal Hi s tory of England, vol. XII: The Hi s tory of England 
During the Reign of Victoria ( 1837^T 9 0 l ), by STHney Low 
and EToyd C~ Sanders (Lo n d o n : Longmans, Green, and Com­
pany, 1907; reprint e d ., New York: AMS Press, Kraus 
Reprint Company, 1969) 308.
27 Yakub Khan to Cavagnari, 20 February 1879 bn 
SP, L V I , Afghanistan No. 1 (1879), C. 2401, 705.
standing illness exacerbated by the travel through north-
28ern Afghanistan in the winter. Those near reported that 
the Amir had lamented his refusal to listen when the Brit­
ish had told him not to expect support from Russia. Next
to the British, he said, "the Russians are mere school—
i ,,29b o y s .
In early March Cavagnari forwarded conditions for 
formal negotiations to Yakub Khan. The British required 
him to relinquish the Khyber and Michni passes, their 
surrounding territory and Kurram, Sibi and Pishin; to sub­
mit his foreign affairs to them for approval; and to
30receive British agents at Kabul. Yakub consented to
the stipulations regarding foreign relations and British
officials in Kabul. He objected, however, to the cession
31of any territory. The British government claimed it
necessary to annex the areas specified because of the pro-
32tective alliances made with the tribes there. Lord 
2 8Ibid., Cavagnari to Viceroy, 28 February 1879,
705.
29
Joshua Duke, Recollections of the Kabul Campaign 
1879 and 1880 (London: W. FT Allen and” Company, F8 8 3) 
57^ 58"---------
30
Viceroy to Cavagnari, 6  March 1879 Ln SP, LVI., 
Afghanistan No. 1 (1879),' C. 2401, 706-07.
31 Ibid., Mohamed Yakoob Khan to Cavagnari,
March 1879"J 707-08 .
^ G .  R. Elsmie, Field-Marsha1 Sir Donald Stewart, 
G.C.B. G.C.S.I., C.I.E.: An Account of His Li£e7 Mainly 
in His Own~WorEs (London: John MurreyV 19031 2711-62.
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Northbrook contended, however, that Disraeli simply 
refused to forfeit the opportunity to strengthen the fron­
tier; a fact demonstrated by the route into Afghanistan
33taken by the British army.
The Amir Yakub Khan arrived at Gandamak (fig. 1)
34to begin negotiations with the British on 8  May 1879.
The Viceroy's military success had restored Disraeli's
confidence in him. He wrote to a friend that he wished
"Lytton and General Roberts were at the Cape of Good 
35Hope." The importance placed by the Government on the
Zulu War in the south of Africa, by contrast, dimmed their
3 6interest in the war in Afghanistan. This diminished
attention permitted the India government more of a free
hand 'in their negotiations with Yakub Khan. The Amir had
gone to Gandamak over the warnings of his advisors that
the British would interpret his presence as acceptance
of their conditions. Yakub held out until 17 May. He
agreed to the British terms after a private audience with 
37Cavagnari. The inducement was not made public. In any 
33 Thomas George Baring Northbrook, "A Brief 
Account of Recent Transactions in Afghanistan" (Printed 
for private circulation, 1880) 1 1 - 1 2 .
o /
Viceroy to Secretary of State, 8  May 1879 ija 
'P, L V I , Afghanistan No. 1 (1879), C. 2401, 713.
3 S
Disraeli to Lady Chesterfield, 8 May 1879 Ln 
Zetland, The Letters of Disrael1 , II, 283.
^ E l s m i e ,  Sir Donald Stewart, 271.
3 7
Ali, The Mohammedzai Period, 97
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event , Yakub Khan and Cavagnari reached a final agreement 
on 26 May which the India government approved on the 
30th.38
The Treaty of Gandamak made Afghanistan a British 
sphere of influence. By its terms the Amir Yakub Khan 
agreed to: 1) a permanent friendship with the British gov­
ernment, 2) amnesty to Afghans who had assisted the 
British during the conflict, 3) submission of all foreign 
affairs to the British government, 4) a British agent at 
Kabul and on the frontiers if necessary, 5) an Afghan 
representative to the India government, 6 ) the security 
of British officials in Afghanistan, 7) free access to 
British merchants and traders, and 8 ) construction of a 
telegraph line from Kurram to Kabul. In return, the 
British government pledged never to intrude in Yakub's
internal affairs, to assist against external threat and
3 9to pay an annual subsidy of six lakhs of rupees to Yakub 
and his successors. By the Treaty, the British would 
restore Jalalabad and Kandahar to Afghanistan. They would 
retain the districts of Kurram, Pishin and Sibi but give
revenue collected there to the Government of Afghan-
. . 40is t a n .
3 8 Government of India to Cranbrook, 2 June 1879 
in SP, L V I , Afghanistan No. 6 , "Despatch of India Forward­
ing Treaty of Peace," C. 2362, 689.
39 Approximately 60,000 pounds sterling.
40 Singhal, India and Afghanistan, 196-97; Aitchi- 
son, A Collection of Treaties^ 240-42.
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Yakub Khan returned to K a b u l , announced the ces­
sation of all dissension between the Afghan and British
governments and declared a general amnesty for all who
41had cooperated with the British. The Viceroy reported
to Salisbury that the Afghan people seemed pleased with 
42the Treaty. Lytton proclaimed, in a letLer to a friend, 
that his "resolute but not immoderate effort" had produced 
the result which advocates of non-interference had sought 
fruitlessly for so long. He had achieved a viable rela­
tionship- with Afghanistan "with the smallest possible loss 
^ 3
of life." Not everyone was as confident about the 
results of the negotiations with Yakub Khan. The Amir 
had little choice but to agree with British conditions.
The Russians had refused to assist and advised his father 
to make peace with England. His years Of imprisonment 
and acquisition of the throne by default had not given 
him a strong base of support. The new Amir's signature
on the Treaty of Gandamak by no means assured its realiza-
* 44t ion .
41 Translation of a Proclamation by the Amir of 
Afghanistan, June 1879 jij} SP, LVI , Afghanistan No. 1 
(1879), C. 2401, 718.
/ o
Viceroy to Secretary of State, 2 July 1879 ijn 
SP, LIII, Afghanistan (1880), "Correspondence Relative 
to the Affairs of Afghanistan," C. 2457, 407.
/ *3
Lytton to Mrs. Morley, 1 June 18 79 in India 
Office Library, Lytton Collection, "Correspondence," Eur 
E 218.522/16 & 171
^ C a m p b e l l , The Afghan Frontier, 67; Northbrook, 
Brief A ccount, 29-307
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The Viceroy did seem to have accomplished his 
objectives. He had removed Russian influence from Kabul, 
gained strategic points along the Northwest Frontier and 
won the long-coveted right to place British agents at 
Kabul. He lost no time, therefore, in arranging the 
first legation to Afghanistan.
The "man-on-the-spot" seemed to have accomplished 
his objectives. He had succeeded in forcing the Afghan 
government to accept British European agents at Kabul.
The cost of his victory was more than the Home government
had anticipated but* it could not risk censor of the Vice­
roy without political injury and loss of the opportunity
to make strategic improvements on the frontier. The unex­
pected death of Shere Ali and his replacement by Yakub 
Khan, who had little support guaranteed, however, addi­
tional obstacles for the British in Aghanistan.
CHAPTER VII
WAR - PHASE II 
August 1879 - August 1881
The Viceroy chose Pierre Louis Napoleon Cavagnari 
to head the long-awaited British Mission to Kabul. Cavag­
nari ’ s father had been a French officer killed in the 
Napoleonic wars. He returned with his mother to her Eng- 
lish home after his father's death. A rather colorful 
gentleman, he had served successfully for several years 
as a Deputy Commissioner and Commissioner in the Northwest 
Frontier areas of the Indian Empire. His style when
dealing with refractory tribesmen had earned the epithet
2
"butcher and bolt" and he rarely remained anywhere long
without provoking an altercation. Perpetually sanguine,
3
he had a knack for seeing only what pleased him.
Numerous British officials, including General 
Roberts, felt uneasy about the Mission's prospects.^ They 
remembered the ill-fated British Mission to Kabul in the 
1830s. Cavagnari himself calculated the odds at four to
■^Edwards, The Grea t G a m e , 99-100.
2
Thorburn, Asiatic Neighbours, 137.
^Edwards, The Great G a m e , 100.
^Roberts, Forty-One Years in India, II, 178-79
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one he would die on the assignment.^ He departed for 
Kabul stating in his flamboyant manner, "...if my death 
sets the red line on the Hindu Kush, I don't care..."
The British delegation entered Afghan territory on 19 July
1879. The Afghans received the Mission in a most gracious 
manner according to General Roberts who escorted it.^ 
Cavagnari met with Yakub Khan shortly after his arrival 
at Kabul. He advised the Amir to inform General Kaufmann 
of the Treaty of Gandamak's conditions regarding Russo-
g
Afghan relations.
The Afghans presumed the Amir would pay the troops
and reduce the heavy taxes caused by the war now that the
British had arrived at Kabul. Yakub Khan allegedly had
9
contributed to that report. Return of military contin­
gents from Herat intensified disorder in the city. The 
Herati soldiers, with little to do, wandered the city 
criticizing both the Amir and the English delegation.
Yakub Khan cautioned Cavagnari to stay within his
^Hanna, The Second Afghan W a r , III, 13.
K. H. M. Diver, Kabul to Kandahar (London: Peter 
D a v i e s , 1935) 45.
^Roberts To Viceroy, 20 July 1879 in Great Brit­
ain, Parliament, Sessional PapersJ L I 1 1 , Afghanistan No.
1 (1880), "Correspondence Relative to the Affairs of 
Afghanistan," C. 2457, 411.
8I b i d ., Cavagnari Interview with Amir, 25 July 
1879, 4221 Yhkub Khan to Kaufmann, 26 July 1879, 418.
9
Ibid., Diary of British Embassy at Kabul, 27 July 
to 2 August 1879, 432.
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cantonment at the Bala Hissar (high fortress) for a few
10days until he had pacified the discontented soldiers.
General Daoud S-hah offered the men a furlough which they
refused, demanding their back pay and the release of their
11commander from prison. The Amir told Cavagnari several
days later he had paid the troops and seized their ammuni- 
12tion. More riots occured in the third week of August,
13however, because of claims for overdue pay.
Yakub Khan seemed unable to overcome his weak­
nesses and garner the support vital to a ruler in Afghan­
istan.. His inability to pay the soldiers had estranged
them. His meddling in military affairs had begun to dis-
1affect his generals. Daoud Shah, his most influential
military leader, appeared ready to align with the 
anti-Yakub faction whose force increased rapidly when the 
Amir refused to compromise with their demands in any way.
The Viceroy received news in the early hours of 
5 September that rebellious troops had attacked the
1879 ,
1 0 r  K  • A nIbid., Cavagnar
424.
i to India Government, 7 August
August
^^ Ibid., Diary 
1879, 434.
of British Emba ssy K a b u l ,
August
^ I b i d ., Diary 
1879, 435.
of British Embassy Kabul , 10-16
August
^ I b i d  . , Diary 
1879, 456-57.
of Bri t ish Embassy K a b u l , 17-23
Augus t
^ Ibid., Diary 
1879, 435.
of British Embassy K a b u l , 10-16
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15British residence at Kabul two days before. The India
government later received various contradictory reports
on the attack on the British Embassy. The majority of
these accounts agreed, however, that several regiments
had gone to the Bala Hissar in the morning to demand their
back pay. They mutineed when the Afghan Government did
not yield, somehow seized weapons and.attacked the nearby
16British residence. By evening all British and most 
native members of the Mission had died either from gun 
shot wounds or the fire set to the residence in the late 
afternoon.
Yakub Khan claimed he had done everything possible
to save Cavagnari and his Mission. He first sent General
Daoud Shah to quell the disturbance but the soldiers
attacked and wounded him so seriously no one expected the
18General to recover. The Amir then despatched his son
"armed" with a Koran and accompanied by several mullahs
19(Moslem religious men). The soldiers ignored them.
15 Ibid., Viceroy to Cranbrook, 15 September 1879,
444.
16 Ibid., Statements Regarding the Disaster at 
Kabul, 445*j Viceroy to Secretary of State, 6  September 
1879; Statement of Ali Hasan, 17 September 1879, 482-83.
^^Ibid., Viceroy to Secretary of State, 6  Septem­
ber 1879, 437.
1 R
Ibid., Yakub Khan to Sirdar Sher Ali Khan, 4 
September 1879 , 465; Statement of Sepoy Muhammed Dost,
18 September 1879, 471.
19 Ibid., Viceroy to Secretary of State, 6  Septem­
ber 1879, 4377
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Most observers contradicted the Amir's claims.
One stated that Daoud Shah actually had helped precipi­
tate the riot by telling the soldiers to go see their
shulzen (wife’s lover), meaning Cavagnari, if they wanted 
20money. Another report maintained Yakub Khan, mostly
concerned with his own safety, did little to stop the
attack. In fact, parts of his army had remained faithful
to him and would have intervened for the British if the
21Amir had ordered them to do so.
The India government, after considering all the
reports, concluded the Amir had not been involved in the 
22assault. It determined, more significantly, that Yakub
Khan had insufficient authority over his people to enforce
the conditions of the Treaty of Gandamak. In consequence,
the Government decided to send a British army to restore
that authority. The Viceroy assured Yakub he personally
had nothing to fear as long as he had been truthful about
his lack of complicity in the massacre on the Mis- 
23sion. Lytton ordered General Massey and his troops t 
20 Ibid., Statement of Ali Hasan, 16 September 
1879, 482-8TT~
2 1 I b i d . , Captain Conally, Ali Khel, to Cranbrook,
10 September T879, 431; Government of India to Cranbrook,
15 September 1879, 439.
22 Ibid., Government of India to Cranbrook, 15 
September 18 7 9, 444; Donald Stewart to Mrs. Stewart, 28 
September 1879 Ln Elsmie, Sir Donald Stewart, 288.
23 India Government to Amir, 13 September 1879 _in 
SP, L I I I , Afghanistan No. 1 (1880), C. 2457, 452.
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24
join Roberts at Ali Khel.
Chaotic conditions in Herat equalled those of
25Kabul. Yakub Khan had appointed his brother Ayub Gover­
nor of Herat in March in an attempt to quiet the distur-
2 6bances of unpaid troops there. Six months later the
27soldiers at Herat had not been paid. The Amir could 
not pay his army. He had no money because he had no 
authority. The cession of Afghan territory to the British 
had erased whatever token power Yakub had possessed. The 
Amir, his son and General Daoud, recovered from his wound, 
sought refuge at the camp of General Baker at Kushi on 
27 S e p t e m b e r . ^
The India government resolved to penalize the 
Afghan nation as a whole unlike the previous year with 
Shere Ali. They instructed General Roberts, however, to 
reserve harsh punishment for those directly involved in
24
Ibid., Viceroy to Secretary of State, 6  Septem­
ber 1879, 4377
2 5
Ibid., Thomson to Salisbury, 23 September 1879, 
410; Thomson, 23 September 1879 in S P , LXXVIII, Central 
Asia No. 1 (1880), "Further Correspondence Respecting Cen­
tral Asia , " 242 .
26Letter From Herat, 16 March 1879 in SP, LXXVIII.
Thomson to Salisbury, 21 September 1879 ini SP, 
LXXVII, Central Asia No. 1 (1880), 241.
7  ft
Roberts To Viceroy, 27 September 1879 in S P ,
L I I I , Afghanistan No. 1 (1880), LIII, C. 2457, 475; Rob­
erts to L y a l l , 29 September 1879, 518-19.
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the attack on the Mission. Roberts successfully occupied 
the city of Kabul by mid-October. He issued a proclama­
tion stating he would inflict a severe penalty for the 
deaths of the British legation and destroy all structures
in the city which prevented effective military occupa- 
29tion. Reports vary but Roberts probably executed less
30than 100 persons. He closed the announcement with the
hope that the British presence in Kabul in time would
transform the malice of the Afghans toward the British
31into friendship.
The Amir notified General Roberts on 13 October
that he wished to abdicate. The General requested he
reconsider but Yakub remained determined to give up his 
32throne. He told Roberts, his "only desire is to be set
free, and end my days in liberty. I have conceived an
33utter aversion for these people." Yakub Khan left the 
British encampment on 1 December for India where he
29
Ibid., A. C. Lyall to General F. S. Robertsj 
29 September T879, 503-04.
30
Low and Sanders, "The History of England," 310; 
See also: Da Costa, Scientific Frontier, 107; Edwardes,
The Great G a m e , 112-13.
^ R o b e r t s  to Lyall, 16 October 1879 bn SP, LIII, 
Afghanistan No. 1 (1880), C. 2457, 553.
32
Ibid., Viceroy to Cranbrook, 23 October 1879,
539-40.
33 Roberts, Forty-One Years in India, II, 236.
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3 4remained until his death in 1923.
The Amir's abdication required an-official pro­
clamation from the British government. Salisbury sent 
a draft proposal to the India government which instructed
Roberts to announce that:
. . . the Amir, having by his own free will abdi­
cated, has left Afghanistan without a Govern­
ment. In consequence of the shameful outrage upon 
the Envoy and suite, the British Government has 
been compelled to occupy by force of arms Kabul 
and to take military p^^session of other parts 
of Afghanistan
Sir Mortimer Durand, an advisor to the Viceroy, described
the draft as the "absurd affectation of preaching histor-
3 6ical morality to the Afghans." He challenged the neces­
sity of issuing any proclamation and argued that the one 
proposed by the Government could only serve to increase 
the bitterness of the Afghan people. Roberts agreed to 
have Durand re-draft the proclamation. Not entirely 
pleased with his own less dictatorial version he, nonethe­
less, believed it less inflammatory than the Govern- 
37ment's. The British government genuinely did not wish 
to create added animosity but it did want to convince the 
Afghans the British would tolerate no further insult.
34 Roberts to Lyall, Kabul Diary, 30 November to 
6  December i_n SP, LIII, Afghanistan No. 1 (1880), C. 2437, 
p. 596; Dupree, Afghanistan, 409.
35 Ibid., Secretary of State to Viceroy, 22 October
1879, 539.
^ S y k e s ,  D u r a n d , 96
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Roberts accordingly informed the people he meant to remain
in Kabul until his Government achieved a satisfactory
settlement. Meanwhile it would be in their own interests
3 8to be cooperative.
British armies had not subdued other parts of
Afghanistan as successfully as General Roberts at
Kabul. Rumors of Ayub Khan's plans to attack Kandahar
39reached the India Government in late November. A report
from Kabul indicated that religious leaders, notably the
Mullah Musht-i-Alam of the National Party, agitated
40against the British. The Viceroy and his Council faced
renewed hostilities and the necessity to make a new deci­
sion about the future of Afghanistan. At least for the
present they could not support an Afghanistan united under
41one government. Consequently, Lytton revived a policy 
first conceived in August 1878 to "break up the Afghan 
Kingdom," install a ruler amicable to Britain and retain 
territory sufficient to safeguard the Northwest
38
Edwardes, The Great G a m e , 112-13; Dacosta,
Scientific Frontier, 107.
39
Thomson to Salisbury, 30 November 1879 in SP
LXXVII, Central Asia No. 1 (1880), 251.
40 Roberts to Foreign Secretary India Government,
7 December 1879 in SP, LIII, Afghanistan No. 1 (1880),
C. 245 7, 586.
A i.Ibid., Governor General of India in Council to 
India O f f i c e , 11 December 1879, 574-75; Government of 
India to Cranbrook, 7 January 1880 in LXX Afghanistan No.
1 (1881), "Further Correspondence ReTating to the Affairs 
of Afghanistan including the Recognition of Sirdar Abdul 
Rahman as Amir of Kabul," C. 2776, 42.
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Frontier. He resolved to relinquish Herat to Persia
because its great distance from Kabul made supervision
ineffective. He also considered handing over the Sistan
to Persia and decided to place Kandahar under a member
of the ruling family who would permit Britain to garrison
troops there. Kurram, Pishin, Sibi and Kabul would remain
A 3under military control until all opposition ceased.
The British government lacked the skilled but
friendly ruler necessary to consolidate the country it
had succeeded in dividing by chance if not by choice. Of
all the potential candidates only Abdur Rahman possessed
44the necessary qualities. The family of Abdur Rahman 
already had made overtures to the British at Kabul on his 
behaIf . ^
Abdur Rahman's ten year exile in Russia did make 
the British somewhat uneasy. He had, however, not only 
strength, but an additional attribute which greatly 
attracted the Viceroy. Lytton hoped to retain Kandahar 
and several other outposts on the frontier. He also
^ 2
Lytton to Cranbrook, 3 August 1878 Ln Balfour, 
Personal and Literary Letters, 113-17.
A 3Government of India to Cranbrook, 7 January 1880 
in SP, L X X , Afghanistan No. 1 (1881), C. 277 6 , 44-45.
^ V i c e r o y  to Lepel Griffin, 6  March 1880 Ln India 
Office Library, Lytton Collection, "Confidential Corres­
pondence Relating to Sirdar Abdul Rahman," Mss Eur E 
522/16, 6 .
^ D o n a l d  Stewart to Foreign Secretary India Gov­
ernment, 3 March 1880 Ln L C , "Afghanistan (1880), Mss Eur 
E 218/12A, 4.
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wished to separate Herat from the Afghan kingdom. One
of his military advisors informed him that, several years
earlier, Abdur Rahman had asked the Wali (governor) of
Kandahar to help him overthrow Shere Ali. If successful,
Abdur Rahman would take the north while the Wali would
have the west of Afghanistan. Although this coup did not
take place, Abdur Rahman's proposal indicated he might
46accept a diminished realm. Lytton advised the Home gov­
ernment to acknowledge Abdur Rahman as the legal successor 
of his grandfather Dost Mohammed as soon as possible.^ 
message from Cranbrook rather dampened the Viceroy's 
enthusiasm. He admonished Lytton to delay a final deci­
sion on the matter of a new ruler until the Afghans com-
48pletely understood "we can do what we will."
On 21 March the Viceroy instructed Lepel Griffin 
at Kabul to find Abdur Rahman and begin negotiations con­
tingent on his agreement to the separation of western from
eastern Afghanistan and the forfeit of Herat and Kand- 
49ahar. Abdur Rahman ignored Griffin's first overture. 
Later he declined the proposal stating that, as Dost
46
Viceroy to Lepel Griffin, 6  March 1880 in L C , 
"Confidential Correspondence Relating to Sirdar ATjcTul 
Rahman," Mss Eur E 218.322/6, 7.
47 Viceroy to Secretary of State, 14 March 1880 
in SP, LXX, Afghanistan No. 1 (1881), C. 2776, 47.
48
Cranbrook to Viceroy, 13 March 1880 in L C , Mss 
Eur E 218.522/6, 32.
49
Ibid., Viceroy to Lepel Griffin, 21 March 1880,
21-24.
133
M o h ammed’s successor, he was entitled to all his terri- 
50t o r y .
In April Prince de Giers advised Lord Dufferin* 
new Ambassador to St. Petersburg, that Afghans near 
Kun d u z , in the far northeast of Afghanistan, had recog­
nized Abdur Rahman as A m i r . ^  Abdur Rahman contacted 
British officials at Kabul two days later. He stated that 
the rivalry between Britain and Afghanistan had caused 
‘severe financial problems for the Afghan people which only
peace could solve-. He suggested Britain and Russia com-
52bine as protectors of a nonpartisan Afghanistan. The 
Viceroy unofficially instructed Griffin to tell Abdur 
Rahman the British government wished to negotiate but 
would not bargain on certain points. Lytton sent these 
directions unofficially because he did not want Cabinet 
members to discover Abdur Rahman had requested negotia­
tions. He believed bargaining with him would implicate
Russia. Cabinet opinions might not fully correspond to 
53his, therefore, he quickly warned Cranbrook that Glad­
stone, the Opposition leader, must not hear of Abdur
^ D a c o s t a , Scientific Frontier, 110-11.
■^Dufferin to Salisbury, 20 April 1880 in Confi­
dential Prints 539, 4277, "Further Correspondence Res­
pecting Russian Proceedings in Central Asia," 161.
52 Lepel Griffin to India Government Foreign Secre­
tary, 22 April 1880 Ln L C , Mss Eur E 218.522/6, 43.
^Ibid., Viceroy to Lepel Griffin, 46-48.
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Rahman's "clumsy bait." Disraeli's dissolution of Parlia­
ment and the impending election made secrecy impera- 
34tive .
The approaching general election prompted Lytton 
to reach a quick agreement with Abdur Rahman. The Opposi­
tion had turned the Government's assertive foreign poli­
cies into a Party i s s u e . ^  Gladstone delivered a speech 
poignantly and dramatically explaining his perception of 
the inherent flaw in Disraeli's Afghan policy. He admon­
ished his listeners to:
. . . remember the sanctity of life in the hill
villages of Afghanistan among the winter snows 
is as inviolable in the eye of the almighty God 
as can be your own. Remember that He who has 
united you as human beings in the same flesh and 
blood, has bound you by the law of mutual love, 
is not limited by the shores of this island, is 
not bound by the limits of Christian civilization, 
that it passes over the whole surface of the 
earth; and embraces the meanest a^gng with the 
greatest in its unmeasured scope.
Gladstone's nicely turned Social Darwinist phrases 
combined with the usual British tendency toward caution 
to decisively defeat the Conservative Government in April
1 8 8 0 . ^  The Queen's aversion to Gladstone delayed forma­
tion of the new Government. Refusal of important liberals
■^Ibid., Viceroy to Cranbrook, 27 April 1880, 89.
■^Roberts, Forty-One Years in India, II, 313; 
Sykes, D urand, 119.
5 6 Bilgrami, Afghanistan and British India, 199. 
■^The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy,
III, 89-90.
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to serve without him forced her to accept Gladstone as
58Prime Minister with Granville as his Foreign Secretary
59and Hartington replacing Cranbrook at the India Office.
Lord K i p o n ^  accepted the Viceroyalty on April 2 8 . ^
Ripon's appointment emphasized the new Govern­
m e n t ’s approach toward India. Lytton had epitomized to
the Liberals the aggressive qualities of Conservative
6 2foreign policy. Ripon, in contrast to his predecessor,
was very knowledgeable about Indian affairs. Over twenty
years earlier he had contended that all Englishmen should
view India as one of their primary concerns. He served
as Undersecretary at the India Office in 1861 and Secre-
tary in 1866 where Lawrence's non-interventionism had
6  3appealed strongly to him. He believed the aggressive
approach of Disraeli had precipitated the war with Afghan- 
64is tan. The new Viceroy proposed the Government give 
Afghanistan a type of client status in which the Amir
■^Zetland, Disraeli, 11, 352.
59 Rastogi, Indo-Afghan Relations, 14.
6 0George Frederick Samuel Robinson -- Viscount
Goderich.
61 Lucien Wolf, Life of the First Marquis of Ripon,
K .G ., P .C ., G .C .S .I ., D .C .L ., etc.,~I (Tondon: JoKn 
Hurray^ T9213 318.
6 2Rastogi, Indo-Afghan Relations, 14-15; S. Gopal, 
The Viceroyalty of Lor<3 Ripon 1880-1884 (London: Oxford 
University P r ess, 1953 ) 1 .
^ G o p a l ,  R i p o n , 3 
64
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retained complete authority over his internal affairs
while the British would advise, not direct, his foreign
n . 65p o l i c y .
Lytton, however, had left Ripon with only two 
immediate alternatives -- withdrawal or make Afghanistan 
part of the Empire. Thus Ripon, like Lytton, turned to 
Abdur Rahman. In order to stabilize the new Amir, he pro­
posed the return of Kandahar, military support when neces­
sary and a treaty substantial enough to keep Abdur Rahman 
from Russia. He advised the retention of Pishin and Sibi
because they provided excellent positions from which to
66scrutinize observance of the treaty.
The rumored march of Ayub Khan and a sizeable army 
from Herat to Kandahar commanded R i p o n ’s immediate atten­
tion. He ordered General Primrose in early June to bar
6  7Ayub from crossing the Helmand. Gradual disaffection
of the troops under Shere Ali, the British appointed Wali
of Kandahar, posed the most serious threat. The number
of his soldiers consistently diminished throughout the
month of July. Many of the deserters headed toward Herat
6 8to join Ayub Khan. Several regiments revolted, taking 
6  5
Gopal, Ripon, 12.
^ W o l f ,  The First Marquis of R i p o n , II, 35, 38.
^ V i c e r o y  to Primrose, 7 July 1880 in SP, LIII, 
Afghanistan No. 3 (1880), C. 2690, 747.
6 8Ibid., Quetta Agent to Government of India,
July 188 0, 747; 13 July 1880, 748; See also: Roberts, 
F orty-One Years in India, II, 331.
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all the supplies with them, as the Wali's army prepared
to cross the Helmartd. Sir Frederick Haines, Commander-
in-Chief of the Indian Army, sent permission on 22 July
to General Primrose at Kandahar to attack Ayub Khan "if
69you consider you are strong enough to ^ do so." Reports
reached Primrose on the same day that A y u b 's army had
crossed the river and that General Burrows had moved his
troops to a safer place in the event of a night a t t a c k . ^
In spite of these precautions, Ayub Khan defeated the
force under Burrows on 28 July 1880 at Maiwand, about
71midway between Kandahar and the Helmand river. Primrose
72urgently cabled for assistance. Earlier in July the
Viceroy had complained to Haines about the weakness of
73the troops at Kandahar. Ripon ordered Roberts at Kabul 
to go to the aid of Primrose and the remains of Bu r r o w ’s 
force for the siege which inevitably would follow Ayub
69 Ibid., Commander-in-Chief to Primrose, 28 July
1880, 863.
^ Ibid., British Resident at Kandahar to Govern­
ment of India, 23 July 1880, 751.
71 Ibid., Governor of Bombay to Secretary of State, 
28 July 18BJT7 752.
72 Ibid., British Agent Quetta to Government of 
India, 28 July 1880, 757.
73 E. B. Johnson to Ripon, 4 July 1880 Pn Great 
Britain, India, Miscel laneous Publ ic Documents '^ B.P. 7/7, 
"Sirdar Ayub K h a n 's Invasion ol Southern Afghanistan,"
16; Ripon to F. Haines, 4 July 1880 Pn B.P. 7/10, "Defeat 
of General Burrow's Brigade and Military Operations in 
Consequence," 23.
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Khan's v i c t o r y . ^
Roberts received a message from Ayub Khan in
mid-August stating that he wished to negotiate a peace
with the B r i t i s h . ^  Roberts replied that no discussion
7 6
could take place until Ayub surrendered. The. army of
Ayub Khan retreated slowly toward Herat while Roberts
77moved closer to Kandahar. Robert's army finally
7 8appeared at Kandahar on the last day of August. Ayub
Khan, with about 15,000 men, waited on the north bank of
79the Arghandab. Robert's army avenged the British defeat
at Maiwand at about noon the next day, capturing A y u b 's
80camp and scattering his troops. Ayub fled toward 
H e r a t . 8 1
74 St. John to Government of India, 2 August 1880 
in SP, L I I I , Afghanistan No. 3 (1880), C. 2690, 761; Vice­
roy to Secretary of State, 3 August 1880, 790; Government 
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815.
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Greatly embellished descriptions of the British
defeat at Maiwand had aroused the Afghans in the north
emphasizing the need for completion of negotiations with 
8 2Abdur Rahman. Ripon asked Sir Donald Stewart, who had
replaced Roberts at Kabul, to explain to the new Amir the
British wi shed to transfer control of the city to him but
could not commit themselves to a fixed subsidy either of
money or arms. If Abdur Rahman refused these terms,
Stewart should negotiate with National Party leaders to
establish a member of Yakub K h a n ’s family as de facto
ruler of Kabul and remain there with his troops for sup- 
8  3port. Abdur Rahman did accept. General Stewart pub-
84licly acknowledged him a>s Amir of Kabul on 22 July. The
British evacuation of Kabul occured on 11 and 12 
A u g u s t .^
Having handed over the north to the new Amir, the 
British tackled the more complex problem of the south.
The retention of Kandahar aroused great debate both at 
home and abroad. From Gibralter, Lord Napier of Magdalla 
argued that revenues and increased trade from Kandahar
Q O
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Lyall to Stewart, 24 July 1880 bn SP, LXX, 
Afghanistan No. 1 (1881), C. 2776, 75.
84 Ibid., Government of India, Foreign Department 
to Hartington, 24 July 1880, 78.
8  5Ibid., Viceroy to Secretary of State, 5 August 
1880, 91; Secretary of State to Viceroy, 5 August 1880,
91.
would offset costs of the withdrawl to the old fron- 
8  6tier. Retired Major-General Henry Green, staunch sup­
porter of the Forward policy, advocated possession of Kan­
dahar to protect the passes to India, particularly neces-
8  7sary if Russia took Merv which looked possible. General 
Haines supported retention in order to observe the activi­
ties of Abdur Rahman. He added that surrendering Kandahar
88’’would be to relinquish any reason had for war.” This
comment undoubtedly evoked anxiety for Conservatives
because Disraeli quite adamantly had insisted he had not
sought a war with Shere Ali to rectify the frontier.
Commander Haines, however, did have several other reasons
for retaining Kandahar. As a military man, he speculated
a Russian army might gain access to Kabul via Kandahar.
He also believed, like Napier, Kandahar might prove a
valuable source of revenue. His judgement that the Afghan
people would view the British cession of Kandahar as a
89sign of weakness, "for in Asia the strong never 
8 6Note on Kandahar by General Lord Napier of 
Magdalla, 12 October 1880 Ln SP, LXX, Afghanistan No. 2 
(1881), "Papers Relative to the Occupation of Kandahar,"
C. 2811, 223-25.
8  7Ibid., Memorandum on the Rectification of the 
Northwest Frontier of India by Major-General Henry Green,
30 December 1878, 170-73.
88 Ibid., Minute by His Excellency Commander-in- 
Chief in India on Retention of Kandahar, 25 November 1880, 
227-31.
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90retreat," constituted his fundamental objection, James 
Fergusson, Governor of Bombay, also emphasized the pos­
sible loss of prestige he felt more destructive than a
91military defeat.
Those who resisted the retention of Kandahar
argued that the complications and expense far outweighed
92the advantages. The most vocal opposition came from 
members of the new Government who had criticized Dis­
raeli's policies toward Afghanistan from the outset. Lord 
Hartington contended the new Amir could never strengthen 
himself without Kandahar. He also pointed out that 
nothing supported the claim of pro-retentionists that the 
people of Kandahar would submit willingly to continued 
British rule. He did not agree the Kandaharis would see
British withdrawal as a sign of weakness but as an affir-
9 3mation they did not intend to extend the Indian Empire.
Hartington and his supporters triumphed and
advised the Government of India by early December to begin 
arrangements to evacuate Kandahar, the Khyber pass and
90 Davies, Border, 13.
91 James Fergusson to Ripon, 20 June 1880 Ln "Mili- 
tary Operations in Afghanistan," B.P. 7/10, 9-10.
92 G. J. Wolseley, Memorandum on Retention of 
Kandahar, 20 November 1880 in SP, LXX, Afghanistan No.
2 (1881) , C. 2811, p. 226.
93 Hartington to Governor General in Council, 21 
May 1880 in SP, LXX, Afghanistan No. 1 (1881), C. 2776, 
67-71.
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94Kurram regions. Afridi chiefs received the Khyber by
a treaty which obligated them to keep it open to the Brit-
95ish in return for a subsidy. Ripon also asked Abdur
Rahman how soon he could assume administration of Kan- 
96dahar. For nearly a month the Amir had-requested a
9 7meeting with the Viceroy. Ripon had responded that
these important issues could not wait until he could
98arrange a state visit for the new Amir. Abdur Rahman
expressed his pleasure at acquiring Kandahar, stated he
would like personally to attend to its acquisition and
defense against Ayub Khan but he could not leave Kabul 
99yet. He agreed to send an envoy but' could not authorize 
him to make any agreements nor could he assure his
94 Ibid., To Governor General in Council, 11 Novem­
ber 1880, TT77
95 Commissioner of Peshawar to Government of India, 
9 February 1881 in SP, L X X , Afghanistan No. 5 (1881), 
"Further Correspondence Relating to the Affairs of Afghan­
istan including the Transfer of the Administration of 
Kandahar to Amir Abdul Rahman Khan," C. 3090, 315; Agree­
ment with Government by Khyber Afridis, February 1881,
330.
96 Ibid., Viceroy to Amir of Kabul, 30 January
1881, 286.
^ Ibid., Amir to Viceroy, 28 December 1880, 270.
98 Ibid., Viceroy to Abdur Rahman, 7 January 1881,
270-71.
99 Abdur Rahman to Viceroy, 13 February 1881 in 
"Proceedings at Kandahar Subsequent to Ayub K h a n ’s 
Defeat," B. P. 7/7, II, 28-29.
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appearance at Kandahar by 15 April as requested. The
101Viceroy agreed to a few day's grace.
The Amir's officials began arriving at Kandahar 
during the first two weeks in April. L t . Colonel St.
John, officiating British Agent, formally assigned Kan­
dahar to Abdur Rahman on 12 April. Nine days later Brit-
102ish troops withdrew. Ayub Khan continued his attempt
to capture Kandahar. The Amir's troops defeated him on
10322 September. Once again he fled to Herat. Abdur
Rahman took the city of Herat in mid-October. Ayub
104escaped to Persia. The Persian government later agreed
105to prohibit Ayub from any area near the Afghan border.
The last trace of direct British involvement in 
Afghanistan focused on the districts of Pishin and Sibi 
claimed in the Treaty of Gandamak. British officials had 
administered these districts for nearly two years. The 
inhabitants assumed they could rely on British protec­
tion. In fact, the British had brought stable government
lOOlbid ^  ^ Amir of Kabul to Viceroy, 26 January 
1881, 288; Amir to Commissioner of Peshawar, 6  March 1881 
in SP, L X X , Afghanistan No. 5 (1881), C. 3090, 328.
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106for the first time to these area. In consequence,
Britain decided to retain Pishin and Sibi. In 1887 the
107two districts became part of British Biluchistan.
Russia had not been idle while the British fought
in Afghanistan. A Russian expedition successfully over-
108came the Turcomans at Goek Teppe on 23 January 1881.
Defeat of the Turcomans was probably the most significant 
Russian achievement in Central Asia. It served the 
purpose of arresting the pilferage which made trade unpro­
fitable. In the larger perspective, it allowed the 
Russians to move their Central Asian headquarters from 
Orenburg, in the east, west to the Caspian, giving the
Russian government significant oversight of Central
a  • 1 0 9Asia .
The British government received a report in early 
May 1881 that the Russians prepared a Mission to acknowl­
edge the new Amir of Afghanistan and to offer him a treaty
106 Government of India to Secretary of State for 
India, 2 February 1881 Tn SP, L X X , Afghanistan No. 3 
(1881), "Further Papers Relating to the Occupation of 
Kandahar," C. 2852, 238.
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110of commerce. Denials poured out of St. Petersburg.
Prince Lobanov, Russian Ambassador to Great Britain, told
Granville in July that his Government had forbidden its
Central Asian officials to engage in any direct communica-
1 1 1tion with Abdur Rahman. De Gier's assistant, Baron
J o m i n i , temporized on Lobanov' statement several weeks
later stating that Russian officials might contact the
1 1 2Amir if the British government agreed. Diplomatically,
the Russians moved carefully. Proximity, however, ren­
dered their subtlety irrelevant. With the annexation of 
the Turcoman territories less than 300 miles, with no
notable physical barrier, separated Russia from Afghanis- 
113t a n .
1 1 0
Granville to Wyndham, 14 May 1881 iri Confiden­
tial Prints 5 3 9 , 4550, "Further Correspondence Respecting 
Affairs in Asia," 19.
^■^Ibid., Granville to Wyndham, 11 July 1881, 
4631, 20.
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CONCLUSION
The British achieved few tenable rewards from 
their conflict With the Afghan government. They had 
excluded Russia from Kabul but not restrained the Russian 
government from extending its control in Central Asia
I
which by 1884 would reach to the Amu Darya; the northern 
border of Afghanistan. The British government hoped the 
ruler they had chosen for Afghanistan would maintain his 
country as a buffer between the Russian and Indian 
Empires. Abdur Rahman did allow the British to dominate 
Afghanistan's foreign relations including the delimita­
tion of his borders. Regrettably, he also reacted to the 
intense foreign involvement his country experienced in 
the late 1870s by "landlocking" Afghanistan. Primarily 
concerned with preserving the integrity of the Afghan peo­
ple, he determined to exclude all foreign interference 
in internal affairs. He dedicated so much time to secur­
ity measures that he had little remaining for internal
2
development efforts. The British, in effect, were 
responsible for retarding the internal growth of Afghan­
istan .
1
Fraser-Tytler, Afghani s t an, 130.
2
Personal Communication with Hasan Kakar,
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The British gained control of two small, but 
strategically located areas on their Northwest Fron­
tier. Command of Pishin and Sibi meant they could keep 
open the passes into Afghanistan and better protect the 
Indian Empire. They were unable, however, to rectify the 
inadequacies of the Northwest Frontier as successfully 
as they had hoped. Several other approaches to India 
still existed for an aggressor who could secure the assis­
tance of the Afghans. That the results did not justify 
the means may indicate that the Disraeli Government did 
not design a policy intended to provoke a war. Disraeli 
and his Foreign Secretary Salisbury initially continued 
a policy toward Afghanistan begun by their predeces­
sors . L a w r e n c e 's approach cannot accurately be described 
as one of complete non-interference. While it is true 
that as Viceroy he did not acknowledge any of the three 
contendors for the sovereignty of Afghanistan after Dost 
Mohammed's death, he did recognize unofficially all three 
at various times as de facto ruler. A policy of strict 
non-intervention would have required that he wait until 
one of the rivals triumphed before making any recogni­
tions. Lord Lawrence and the two subsequent Viceroys,
Mayo and Northbrook, all periodically supplied Shere Ali , 
once he acquired the throne, with money and munitions. In 
1872 and 1873 the British government involved itself in 
Afghan affairs by mediating with the Russian government 
for a border agreement and delimiting the border between
148
Afghanistan and Persia in the Sistan. Finally, the ques­
tion of British agents in Afghanistan did not originate 
with the Disraeli Government. Lawrence, Mayo and North­
brook queried both Dost Mohammed and Shere Ali on the 
subject but, unlike their successors, they accepted the 
refusals given.
It is difficult to deny that Disraeli and Salis­
bury intended to employ more assertive means to keep Rus­
sia from extending her hegemony over Afghanistan. But 
a series* of other factors determined that their methods 
end in armed conflict and prevented a more significant 
restructuring of the Northwest Frontier by negotiation.
The structure of the British Government, from mon­
arch to viceroy, contributed heavily to the cause of 
war. Queen Victoria, responsive to Disraeli's appraisal 
of good foreign policy, offered her moral support and used 
her influence to discourage opposition. Disraeli and 
Salisbury, determined to use Afghanistan as an example 
of their toughened policy toward Russian encroachments 
in Central Asia, deliberately chose an inexperienced vice­
roy because they knew he would support them. They did 
not realize, however, that Ly t t o n ’s temperament would 
cause him to go to extreme lengths, that he would ignore 
or even disobey orders in his attempt to fulfill his 
interpretation of their instructions. In fact, the Vice­
roy misconstrued Salisbury's directions from the begin­
ning. The Foreign Secretary told Lytton to arrange for
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a temporary mission to Kabul in order to show the Afghan 
people and Government they had nothing to fear from the 
British. He also authorized the Viceroy to offer Shere 
Ali an annual subsidy, an agreement to recognize his suc­
cessors and aid against external threat. Salisbury did 
not stipulate that the Amir accept a British agent in 
Afghanistan as a condition for negotiations. Therefore,
L y t t o n 1s insistence on this at the Peshawar Conference
3
was not sanctioned by the Home government.
Salisbury's methods also warrant consideration 
because he addressed neither his initial instructions nor 
the majority of his ensuring communications to the 
Governor-General in Council, but to the Viceroy alone.
For example, Salisbury relayed his agreement to Lytton's 
decision to close the Peshawar meetings after the death 
of Syud Nur Mohammed by confidential communication to the 
Viceroy.^ Lytton later used one of these communiques to 
defend his termination of the meeting at Peshawar and 
refusal to send the British native agent back to the 
Amir's Court. Salisbury had told him to 'r adopt such
3
Secretary of State to Government of India, 28 
February 1876 i_n Philips , The Evolution of India and Pak- 
istan, 447 .
^Salisbury to Governor-General, 4 October 1877 
in Great Britain, Parliament, Sessional Papers , LVI , 
ATghanistan (1878), "Correspondence Respecting the Rela­
tions of the British Government and that of Afghanistan 
Since the Accession of the Ameer Shere Ali Khan," 596-97.
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measures for the protection and tranquility of the North­
west Frontier as circumstances of the moment may render 
expedient without regard to the wishes of the Ameer, or 
interests of his dynasty..."^
The Viceroy's interpretation of these circum­
stances deserves comment. Rarely is the Amir seen as more 
of a pawn between Russia and Britain than in the episode 
of the Kaufmann correspondence. The two Powers had 
excluded him in the delimitation of his northern border 
in 1872. Russia agreed to stay out of Afghanistan while 
Britain consented to keep the Amir within his own bor­
ders. Shere Ali accepted this decision in an attempt to 
assure British protection against the threat of Russian 
invasion. When the first letters arrived from Kaufmann, 
the Amir complained to the British but they scoffed at 
his fears and instructed him to reply. Lytton, however, 
complained to Salisbury, after the failure of the Peshawar 
Conference, that * there can be no doubt that the
communications between General Kaufmann and Shere Ali 
exceed the requirement of mere exchanges of cour- 
tesy...." Shere Ali's refusal to discuss the possibility
5
Viceroy to Cranbrook, 8  August 1878 in Great 
Britain, Foreign Office, Confidentia1 P r ints 5 3 9 , 3871, 
"Further Correspondence Respecting Russian Proceedings 
in Central Asia," 309-10.
Governor-General of India in Council to Salis­
bury, 3 May 1877 in SP, L X X X , Central Asia No. 1 (1878), 
"Correspondence Respecting Central Asia," 565.
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of British agents provoked the Viceroy to seize the Kauf­
mann correspondence as an excuse to challenge the Amir.
Lytton, because of his unfamiliarity with orien­
tal customs, did not realize that successful transactions 
with Asian rulers required a great deal of diplomacy and 
finesse. He chose rather to regard the Amir as unciv­
ilized and perhaps even i n s a n e /  and convinced Disraeli 
and Salisbury they must treat Shere Ali like a child and 
demand he "behave." Consequently, the Viceroy totally 
ignored promises made by former viceroys not to require
g
British European agents in Afghanistan. Thus, when he 
received word of a Russian Mission on its way to Kabul, 
he assumed the Amir had invited it. Cranbrook, in defense 
of Lytton, later contended that, the Russian Mis­
sion was sent there for real and definite objects.
Afghanistan was to be the basis for Russia to attack
9
us. There is no doubt about it." The Amir may have 
requested Kaufmann send a delegation or he simply may have 
accepted a fait accompli once the Mission had crossed his 
border. Certainly the uncooperative attitude of the 
British at Peshawar gave him ample reason to despair.
^Fraser-Tytler, Afghanistan, 132.
^Speech of the Duke of Argyl, 20 February 1880 
in Great Britain, Parliament, Hansard 1 js Pari i amen tar y 
Debates (Lords), C C L , 1023; B u nie, British Agents, I;
Eastwick, L y t t o n , 19.
^Cranbrook, 20 February 1880, in CCL, 1057-58.
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The unwillingness of Lytton to file the dissents 
of his Council as prescribed by regulations or to communi­
cate officially with the Secretary of State for India in 
Council shows his tendency to abuse viceregal author­
ity. In Parliament, the Chancellor of the Exchequer con­
doned Lytton's methods with the argument that Indian 
officials commonly sent sensitive information directly 
to the Secretary because formerly, under the East India 
Company Board of Directors, a Secret Committee had handled 
such m a t t e r s .^  Sir William Muir, one of the dissenting 
members of the Viceroy's Council, objected to the practice 
stating that the lack of official communication between
the Governments in India and London unfairly endangered
11the Council's prerogatives.
The Viceroy's failure to gauge the support of the 
Afghan peoples for their ruler also illustrates his 
ignorance of Afghanistan. He believed the constant 
internecine quarrels in Afghanistan inferred the people 
would hesitate to follow the Amir into a war with a great 
military power like Britain. Based on this misconception, 
Lytton issued the proclamation that the British quarreled 
with the Amir alone and not the people. This statement 
actually insulted the Afghans and. united the majority in
1 0 Ib i d ■, CCXLII, 2017-18.
11 Singhal, India and Afghanistan, 1
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support of Shere A l i .
An important pressure group the military •- must 
share criticism for the mistaken idea that the Afghans 
would not resist a British invasion. Many of the Vice­
roy's military advisors, particularly General Roberts, 
had spent sufficient years in the Indian army to estimate 
more accurately the strength of the resistance. They 
should have predicted that complete subjection of the 
independent Afghans would not be as simple as Lytton 
claime-d. ^
Finally, no serious consideration of the responsi­
bility of the Russian government for allowing one of their 
officials to despatch a delegation to Afghanistan seems 
to have occured. Lytton did request his superiors to 
remind the Russians that the conditions of their Agreement 
in 1872 prohibited direct communication with the Amir.
After the Treaty of Berlin ended the possibility of a war 
between Russia and Great Britain, the British, however, 
tendered few serious objections about Afghanistan to St. 
Petersburg. In fact, Britain appeared to intentionally 
ignore Russia's culpability and willingly accepted assur­
ances that the Mission had innocent objectives. They pre­
ferred to see the Amir as the guilty party illicitly 
seeking Russian aid against them.
12 Kakar, A Political and Diplomatic History of 
Afghanis t a n , 224-25.
13Ibid■, 279.
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Many unforseen circumstances exacerbated the 
fragile balance of peace between Afghanistan and Brit­
ain. The death of Shere A l i 's son Abdulla Jan, for 
example, gave the Amir a normally legitimate reason to 
delay a decision about reception of the British Mis­
sion. It happened, however, at a time when the Viceroy 
needed a justification for the strong measures he had 
decided necessary to rid Afghanistan of Russian influ­
ence. The death of the Amir at first seemed a fortunate 
occurence because it allowed the British to conclude a 
hasty treaty with his son. But a treaty does not ensure 
peace and Yakub Khan's inability to gain support from his 
father's subjects guaranteed further hostilities.
The attack on the Cavagnari Mission also might 
be considered a chance event. If Cavagnari had been less 
contentious, however, he might have prevented his own 
death and the renewal of war, by requesting his Government 
pay the Afghan soldiers. Lytton later wrote to Cranbrook 
explaining his decision to send Cavagnari to Kabul over 
the protests of many advisors. He contended that Yakub 
Khan had proposed Kabul as the location of the British 
Residency in order to protect it and to offer to his 
people visible evidence of the reestablished friendship 
between Afghanistan and Britain. Lytton concluded he had 
no tenable grounds for opposing Yakub since the Amir did 
not hesitate to have the Mission at his Capitol
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city. No doubt Yakub did wish to observe the British 
Resident. The Viceroy, however, had not insisted upon 
having ’’tenable grounds” to oppose rulers of Afghanistan 
on any previous occasion.
Clearly, neither Lawrence's policy of "masterly
inactivity” nor the "forward” policy of Disraeli was
entirely responsible for precipitating the Second
Anglo-Afghan war. In the words of Lord Curzon, a later
Viceroy of India, "We owe our record of Afghan failure
and disaster.... to the amazing political incompetence that
has with fine continuity been brought to bear upon our
15relations with successive Afghan rulers.” No strong, 
consistent policy guided the decision-makers in their 
task. The war occured rather as a result of a series of 
decisions designed to implement policies hampered by an 
inconclusive system of guidelines. The decision-makers 
chose options with short-range problem solving poten­
tial. Consequently, when the need for new decisions mate­
rialized in response to problems raised by the limitations 
of prior decisions, the impact of factors other than Gov­
ernment policy controlled the results. Protection of the 
Indian Empire indeed made Afghanistan important to the
14 Lytton to Cranbrook bn SP, L X X , Afghanistan No.
1 (1881), "Further Correspondence Relating to the Affairs 
of Afghanistan Including the Recognition of Sirdar Abdul 
Rahrnan Khan as Amir of Kabul,” C. 277 6 , 39-40.
15 Curzon, Russia in Central Asia, 336.
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British. But the politics and temperaments of Government 
officials, the response of the "victim" and the element 
of chance led Britain into a second war with Afghanistan.
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Figure 1 ..-The area of Afghanistan. Short dashed line 
indicates nominal modern border as of 1978; dotted lines 
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Figure 2.-Northwest Frontier of the British Indian 
E m p i r e .
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Figure 3.-Russian incursions into Central Asia (adapted 
from Lyons, 1910; Singhal, 1963; and Dupree 1973; boun­
daries only approximate). Dates indicate approximate time 
of establishment of control for area enclosed by long 
da shed lines.
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